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This paper provides a comparative summary of the 
payout phase of pension systems in five countries—
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five countries have large pension systems with mandatory 
or quasi-mandatory retirement savings schemes. But they 
exhibit important differences in the structure and role 
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This paper on 'The Payout Phase of Pension Systems: A Comparison of Five Countries' 
was part of a broader project on life annuities and retirement products, coordinated by 
Roberto Rocha, Senior Adviser at the Finance and Private Sector Development in the 
Middle East North Africa Region, and former Manager at the Financial and Private 
Sector Development Vice-Presidency of the World Bank. The paper is published by 
Global Capital Markets Non Bank Institutions of the Financial and Private Sector 
Development Vice-Presidency of the World Bank.  The project was initiated in 2004 to 
fill an apparent gap in the pension literature, especially in the literature addressing the 
payout phase of defined-contribution pension systems.  
 
Many countries that have implemented systemic pension reforms and introduced private 
pension systems are now facing the challenge of organizing the payout phase for retiring 
workers. This entails introducing a well-regulated market for retirement products, 
covering the effective regulation and supervision of retirement products, marketing 
activities, providers and intermediaries. However, the literature on the payout phase is 
generally focused on a few countries and topics and does not address in sufficient detail 
the institutional and regulatory issues faced by policymakers in reforming countries.  
 
The World Bank project fills this gap by reviewing in detail a number of representative 
country cases, including Australia, Chile, Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland. These 
countries have large mandatory or quasi-mandatory private pension systems operating 
primarily on a defined-contribution basis and have already entered the payout phase.  
Moreover, their institutional and regulatory arrangements for the payout phase are 
different in many aspects, including decentralized and centralized arrangements for the 
provision of life and term annuities, different menus of retirement products, different 
approaches to price regulation and risk sharing, different marketing rules, and different 
capital rules for providers. Therefore these countries provide a rich variety of experiences 
and policy lessons for other reforming countries. The current paper provides a 
comparative summary of the experience of the five countries covered in this project and 
the lessons they offer for other countries. A companion paper (Rocha and Vittas 2010) 
addresses policy issues and constraints in designing the payout phase with particular 





This paper provides a comparative summary of the payout phase in five countries. All 
five countries (Australia, Chile, Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland) have large pension 
systems with mandatory or quasi-mandatory retirement savings schemes that are mostly 
based on defined contribution (DC) plans. But the five countries also exhibit important 
differences in the structure and role of different pillars, in the regulation of payout 
options, in the level of annuitization, in market structure, in capital regulations and in risk 
management and use of risk sharing arrangements. The different institutional and 
regulatory arrangements provide a rich set of experiences that may be useful and relevant 
for other reforming countries.
1 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides an overview of the pension 
systems of the five countries, focusing on the relative role of different pillars and 
highlighting the target replacement rates in each country. The third section examines the 
menu of available products and discusses the crucial role that product and marketing 
regulation plays in shaping the total market. This section also summarizes information on 
the level of annuitization that prevails in each country. The fourth section focuses on the 
regulation of providers of retirement products, looking in turn at institutional 
arrangements, the prevalence of centralized or decentralized management, and the design 
of investment and capital regulations. This section also contains a brief discussion of risk 
management issues and the role of risk-sharing arrangements. The paper concludes with a 
summary of policy lessons for other countries.
2 
 
2.   Overview of Pension Systems 
 
2.1  Overall Structure of Pension Systems 
 
All five countries covered in this paper have well-developed pension systems. As shown 
in Table 1, they all have a multi-pillar structure combining public and private provision, 
including a mandatory or quasi-mandatory private pillar. All countries have a zero public 
pillar providing basic benefits, but the level of provision varies considerably.  Only 
Sweden and Switzerland have contributory and earnings-related public schemes (first 
pillars).  Denmark and Sweden have supplementary public schemes, the ATP in Denmark 
and the PPM in Sweden, that are mandatory and fully funded and operate alongside the 
private occupational funds. All counties have voluntary third pillars for additional 





                                                 
1 The paper is part of a broader project on annuities that comprises more in-depth country studies, and 
draws on these individual studies: Andersen and Skjodt (2007); Brunner and Thorburn (2008); Buetler and 
Ruesch (2007); Palmer (2008); Rocha and Thorburn (2007); Rocha and Rudolph (2010); and Vittas (2008). 
2 A more detailed discussion of policy issues and constraints is contained in Rocha and Vittas (2010).   
  3




















































Sources: Andersen and Skjodt (2007); Brunner and Thorburn (2008); Buetler and Ruesch (2007); Palmer 
(2008); Rocha and Rudolph (2010); Rocha and Thorburn (2007); and Vittas (2008). 
 
Table 2 describes in greater detail the overall structure of the five pension systems.  More 
details on the benefits and costs of different pillars are offered below. 
 





(Pillars 0 and 1) 






Australia  Universal pension financed from 
general tax revenues and subject 
to clawback provisions 
Occupational system, operating 
mostly DC plans. Provision 
through corporate, industry or 
retail funds. 
Voluntary plans for additional 
provision and for self-employed 
workers. 
Chile (1)  Means-tested  universal 
pension and declining supplement 
to low-income pensioners, 
financed from general tax 
revenues and a sovereign fund. 
  
Open pension funds operating 
DC plans and managed by 
independent pension fund 
administrators (AFPs). 
Voluntary plans for additional 
provision and for self-employed 
workers.  Offered by Pillar 2 
pension funds and other 
financial institutions. 
Denmark  (1) Universal pension financed 
from general tax revenues.  
(2) Supplement to low-income 
pensioners.  
Both benefits are subject to 
clawback provisions. 
(1) Public schemes (mainly 
ATP) operating DC plans. 
(2) Occupational funds and 
insurance companies operating 
mostly DC plans, based on 
collective agreements. 
Voluntary plans for workers not 
covered by labor agreements 
and for additional provision.  
Offered by pension funds, 
insurance companies, and 
banks. 
Sweden   (1) Contributory public scheme 
operating as notional defined 
contribution (NDC) plan. 
(2) Minimum pension guarantee 
for combined NDC and FDC 
benefits. 
(1) Public scheme (PPM) 
operating funded DC plan. 
(2) Occupational funds operating 
mostly DC plans, based on 
collective labor agreements. 
Voluntary pension plans for 
workers not covered by labor 
agreements and for additional 
provision.  Offered by insurance 
companies and banks. 
Switzerland  (1) Contributory DB plan, subject 
to tight maximum and minimum 
limits, partly financed from 
general tax revenues.  
(2) Means-tested supplement to 
low-income pensioners. 
Occupational funds and 
insurance companies operating 
mostly DC plans, but with 
absolute minimum guaranteed 
return and minimum annuity 
conversion factor.  
Voluntary pension plans for 
self-employed workers not 
covered by the mandatory pillar 
and for additional provision. 
Offered by insurance companies 
and banks.  
Sources: Andersen and Skjodt (2007); Brunner and Thorburn (2008); Buetler and Ruesch (2007); Palmer 
(2008); Rocha and Rudolph (2010); Rocha and Thorburn (2007); and Vittas (2008). 
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2.2  Structure and Cost of Public Pillars 
 
There are large differences in the structure of the zero pillars among these five countries 
(Table 3). Australia and Denmark offer universal pensions financed from general tax 
revenues. These are subject to clawback provisions. Denmark also pays a supplement to 
low income pensioners. The level of the universal benefit is 25 percent of the average 
wage in Australia for single pensioners and nearly 42 percent for couples. In Denmark 










(Percent of average wage) 
Clawback or Top Up Provisions
 
Australia  Universal  Single rare: 25% 
Couples: 41.7% 
Income Test 
40% clawback  
above low income threshold 
 
Asset Test 
1.5 per mil clawback  
above high asset threshold 
Chile Universal  pension  to 
impoverished old people  
Basic pension  (PBS) 17% 
Maximum pension with 
solidarity  (PMAS) 57% 
 
Top-Up to Pillar 2 pension 
 
Universal pension is means 
tested 















30% clawback above low 
income threshold 
Sweden  Minimum pension guarantee for 
combined NDC and FDC benefits
 
About 30%  Top up to NDC and FDC 
benefits 
Switzerland  Minimum pension from pillar 1 
 






Supplement is means tested 
Sources: Andersen and Skjodt (2007); Brunner and Thorburn (2008); Buetler and Ruesch (2007); Palmer 
(2008); Rocha and Rudolph (2010); Rocha and Thorburn (2007); and Vittas (2008). 
 
 
Chile closed down its old social security system to new workers when it implemented its 
pension reform in 1981. However, a new basic solidarity pension (PBS) was introduced 
in 2008. This is offered to pensioners who do not have adequate balances to purchase a 
life annuity above the PBS level. The PBS currently amounts to approximately 17 percent 
of the average wage. Low-balance workers are compelled to use phased withdrawals and 
the government pays the PBS after their balances have been exhausted. In order to 
minimize the probability of triggering the PBS, the 2008 amendments to the pension law 
                                                 
3 The clawback provisions are discussed in section 2.4 below.  
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require that the calculation of PWs include a fair actuarial factor to account for this risk. 
The government also tops up any annuity payments that fall below the PBS level. In 
addition the Government provides a pension supplement to pensioners in the lowest 60 
percent of the income distribution. This is equal to the PBS less 29.4 percent of the 
pension income of individual pensioners. The supplement is effectively eliminated when 
pension income is close to 60 percent of the average wage (the exact point of elimination 
depends on the level of the PBS relative to the average wage). This level is known as the 
maximum pension with solidarity support (PMAS). PMAS is gradually increasing and it 
is expected to reach approximately USD 600 in July 2011. The new universal pension 
effectively covers uninsured workers, who represent a significant proportion of all 
workers because of the continuing large relative importance of the informal labor market. 
 
In Sweden a minimum pension guarantee of about 30 percent of the average wage covers 
the combined benefits from the new NDC and FDC schemes. In Switzerland, benefits 
from the first pillar are subject to a minimum level that is about 18 percent of the average 
wage. However, an additional means-tested supplement is paid from general tax revenues 
to pensioners with no other sources of income. This is estimated at 6 percent of average 
earnings, bringing the level of the combined benefit to 24 percent of average earnings.  
 
Only Sweden and Switzerland have a first pillar (Table 4). These are contributory public 
schemes with earnings-related benefits. 
 
Table 4: Structure of First Pillars 
Country 
  Type  Contribution Rate 
(Percent of covered earnings)




































Sources: Andersen and Skjodt (2007); Brunner and Thorburn (2008); Buetler and Ruesch (2007); Palmer 
(2008); Rocha and Rudolph (2010); Rocha and Thorburn (2007); and Vittas (2008). 
 
Sweden implemented a radical reform of its pension system in the mid-1990s. A new 
public unfunded NDC scheme was introduced to replace the pre-existing flat and 
earnings-related (ATP) DB pensions. The contribution rate for the NDC scheme is 16 
percent of covered earnings. Out-of-employment spells are covered by government 
contributions and thus most workers are likely to have full contribution records.  The 
targeted replacement rate for people on average earnings and retiring at normal retirement 
age amounts to 39 percent.  
  
In the NDC scheme, the retirement decision is left to individual workers (within certain 
limits) but the pension benefit is adjusted to take account of the remaining life expectancy 
on retirement.  NDC balances earn notional interest at 1.6 percent in real terms and NDC  
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annuities are calculated with cohort life tables and a real rate of interest of 1.6 percent. 
They are indexed to prices but are adjusted for real wage increases above 1.6 percent. 
The NDC scheme is supported by five buffer funds that have been created since the 
introduction of the general supplementary pension scheme (ATP) in 1960. The buffer 
funds, known as AP funds 1 to 4 and 6, have accumulated assets equivalent to 30 percent 
of GDP. 
 
Switzerland operates an earnings-related and unfunded first pillar. The contribution rate 
is 8.4 percent for workers in dependent employment, equally divided between employers 
and employees. Self-employed workers pay a slightly smaller contribution. The 
government covers by design 20 percent of old age benefits and 50 percent of disability 
benefits. Pension benefits are set within a narrow range with very low dispersion. The 
maximum pension is double the minimum and amounts to about 36 percent of average 
earnings. The minimum and maximum benefits are set in Swiss francs by government 
decision and their relation to average earnings may vary from year to year. The maximum 
benefit requires a full contribution history, but most people receive the maximum benefit 
because even housewives, students and the unemployed are required to make 
contributions.  The average benefit is close to 33 percent of the average wage. 
  
The cost of public pensions from both pillars zero and one varies across the five 
countries, depending on the demographic structure of the population, the generosity of 
benefits and the maturity of the system (Figure 1).   
 
Figure 1: Cost of Old Age Benefits in Pillars Zero and One (% of GDP)  
 
 
Sources: Andersen and Skjodt (2007); Brunner and Thorburn (2008); Buetler and Ruesch (2007); DIPRES 
(2009); Palmer (2008); Rocha and Rudolph (2010); Rocha and Thorburn (2007); and Vittas (2008). 
Note: The 1.0% figure in Chile is the expected annual long term cost of the solidarity pillar.  
  
The highest level of cost among the five countries is found in Sweden at over 7 percent of 
GDP, followed by Switzerland and Denmark. This clearly reflects the high level of public  
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benefits, the universal coverage of the pension systems and the age structure of the 
populations. The cost of public pensions is lower in Australia because the level of the age 
pension is much smaller and the population is significantly younger. The lowest level is 
found in Chile, mainly because the public benefit is much lower and the pension 
supplement is paid to low-income pensioners. The younger demographic structure is also 
a factor. 
 
2.3  Structure of Private Pillars 
 
All countries have mandatory or quasi-mandatory second pillars based on defined 
contribution schemes, but this pillar is organized differently across countries (Table 5).  
In the cases of Denmark and Sweden it includes a combination of public and 
occupational pension funds. In Denmark, the ATP involves centralized administration, 
asset management and annuity provision, while in Sweden the PPM has centralized 
administration and annuity provision but offers to participants the option of decentralized 
asset management during both the accumulation and payout phases. Occupational funds 
in both countries are covered by collective labor agreements. In Denmark they are mostly 
managed by multi-employer funds and life insurance companies; in Sweden, by multi-
employer funds that follow the PPM model.  
 
In the other three countries the second pillar is operated only by private pension funds, 
but these funds are structured differently. The Chilean system is operated by open 
pension funds managed by dedicated pension fund managers, the Swiss system is based 
on occupational funds, managed by single-employer or multi-employer foundations and 
insurance companies, and the Australian system combines occupational funds (single or 
multi-employer) and retail funds.   
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(1) Public scheme (ATP) 








(1) Public scheme (PPM) 








operated by foundations 
and insurers 
 
DC with minimum 
investment return and 
annuity conversion 
factor 
Age-related 7-18% on 
coordinated earnings 
(between 8 and 9 % 
 on total earnings) 
* see text for elaboration. 
Sources: Andersen and Skjodt (2007); Brunner and Thorburn (2008); Buetler and Ruesch (2007); Palmer 
(2008); Rocha and Rudolph (2010); Rocha and Thorburn (2007); and Vittas (2008). 
 
Second pillars are now mostly (Australia, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland) or entirely 
(Chile) based on DC plans. In Australia, defined benefit plans and especially hybrid 
funds, which combine elements of DB and DC plans, still have a significant presence.  In 
Denmark, the ATP and some of the occupational funds offer deferred group annuities, 
which change their character to that of hybrid plans. In Switzerland, the mandatory 
component of pension plans is stipulated as minimum defined credits in notional 
retirement accounts. A minimum contribution rate and a minimum interest rate (MIR) are 
specified as well as a minimum annuity conversion factor (ACF) on retirement. Both the 
MIR and ACF were held constant for 17 years after the creation of the mandatory system 
in 1985 but the MIR is now set annually in line with the level of market rates, while the 
ACF is set to decline gradually over the next few years until it reaches a more sustainable 
level. 
 
Contribution rates vary within a rather narrow range. They are lowest in Sweden where 
they equal a combined 6 to 7 percent depending on the type of collective labor agreement 
(2.5 percent for the PPM and 3.5 to 4.5 percent for occupational plans). In Switzerland, 
the postulated minimum contribution rates, which vary by age, are calculated on so-called 
"coordinated earnings", which range between 30 and 120 percent of average earnings. 
The average contribution rate, calculated on total earnings, amounted to between 8 and 9 
percent in 2005.  In Australia, the contribution rate is a flat 9 percent, while in Chile it 
amounts to 10 percent.  Chilean workers also pay an average of 2.1 percent of salaries to 
cover the cost of group term life and disability insurance and the operating costs and 
profit margins of pension fund administrators. In the other four countries, operating costs 
are either covered by employers or deducted from investment returns. Contribution rates 
vary by collective labor agreement in Denmark. The OECD Pensions at a Glance study 
assumes an average contribution rate of nearly 12 percent of earnings, based on  
  9
contribution rates of the ATP and the collective agreement with the largest coverage 
(OECD 2007). However, the average contribution rate in Denmark may be significantly 
lower (see below).  
 
The creation of second pillars has generated considerable flows of long-term savings into 
pension funds (Figure 2). The level of annual contributions varies from 3.8 percent of 
GDP in Chile to 7.1 percent in Australia and Switzerland. The higher level in these two 
countries is explained by the near universal coverage of their second pillars and the fact 
that covered salaries represent a higher proportion of GDP than in Chile. In the case of 
Australia, annual contributions also include the co-contributions made by government for 
low income workers, while in Switzerland they also cover contributions made for super-
obligatory benefits.  
 
Denmark and Sweden report lower annual contribution flows relative to GDP, despite the 
near universal coverage of their second pillars. In the case of Sweden this is explained by 
the lower contribution rate to second pillar schemes. However, including premiums paid 
on voluntary insurance schemes (third pillar plans), the total annual contributions amount 
to 6.8 percent of GDP. In the case of Denmark, the statistics imply that the average 
contribution rate is lower than the combined rate of 12 percent for ATP and occupational 
schemes indicated above. The combined rate is probably between 8 and 8.5 percent. In 
Denmark, workers contribute an additional 1.4 percent of GDP to personal pension plans.  
 














Australia Chile Denmark Sweden Switzerland
 
Sources: Andersen and Skjodt (2007); Brunner and Thorburn (2008); Buetler and Ruesch (2007); Palmer 
(2008); Rocha and Rudolph (2010); Rocha and Thorburn (2007); and Vittas (2008). 
 
All countries have third pillars providing additional benefits and offering provision to the 
self-employed and other workers that are not covered by the mandatory and quasi-
mandatory second pillars. There are some differences in the organization of voluntary 
arrangements but available information does not provide a detailed picture of the 
structure of third pillars. Voluntary schemes benefit from tax incentives that are  
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particularly powerful in the case of high-income professionals and other self-employed 
people. They also benefit from greater investment freedom and a lighter regulatory 
burden.  
 
The high level of annual contributions combined with high investment returns and at least 
initially low levels of benefits have resulted in a large accumulation of retirement assets. 
Available data do not allow a clear identification of assets that have been accumulated on 
behalf of active workers and those that support the payout phase. In addition, the statistics 
on third pillar assets are not comprehensively and separately identified in all countries.  
 
Total assets in the second pillar range from 120 percent in Switzerland to 75 percent in 
Sweden (Figure 3). Switzerland also reports very high levels of third pillar assets with 
insurance companies and banks, amounting to 62 percent of GDP. In Denmark and 
Sweden, third pillar assets held with insurance companies are reported together with 
second pillar assets. Those held with banks amounted to 14 percent of GDP in Denmark 
and 2 percent in Sweden. Denmark and Sweden also report high levels of assets with 
public pension funds. In Denmark these represent the accumulated assets of ATP and a 
couple of other smaller schemes. In Sweden, they include the buffer funds of the AP 
funds that support the benefits of the NDC scheme and the assets accumulated under the 
PPM scheme. PPM assets amounted in 2006 to 10 percent of GDP. In Chile, in addition 
to pension fund assets, the recently created pension stabilization fund holds assets 
amounting to 2.3 percent of GDP; insurers hold assets amounting to 20 percent of GDP 
and backing the provision of life annuities; and voluntary savings amount to 
approximately 2 percent of GDP. 
 
Figure 3: Total Retirement Assets (% of GDP) 
 
 
Sources: Andersen and Skjodt (2007); Brunner and Thorburn (2008); Buetler and Ruesch (2007); Palmer 
(2008); Rocha and Rudolph (2010); Rocha and Thorburn (2007); and Vittas (2008).  
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2.4  Target Replacement Rates 
 
Actual replacement rates (defined as the ratio of the initial benefit to the individual wage 
at retirement) depend on many factors, such as the generosity of public schemes, the 
period of contribution, the contribution rates to private funded schemes, and actual net 
rates of return on these schemes relative to wage growth. Actual replacement rates also 
depend on how final balances in funded schemes are converted into streams of retirement 
income, such as annuities and phased withdrawals.  
 
Comparing actual replacement rates across countries has proven difficult, as it requires 
detailed information on initial benefits from various pillars as well as wages at retirement.  
However, it is possible to estimate target replacement rates by making some basic 
assumptions about key variables, such as the period of contribution, net rates of return, 
and the conversion of final second pillar balances (Figure 4). 
 
The results are highly sensitive to the retained assumptions, especially the relation 
between the rate of growth of real wages and the real rate of net investment returns. In 
this paper, we specify two scenarios of real net investment returns, 3.5 and 5 percent per 
year, combined with a 2 percent growth of real wages. The calculations assume 
contributions over 40 years and a retirement life of 20 years. Use of a life annuity is 
assumed and everything is indexed to prices.   
 
The target replacement rates also reflect the interaction between the clawback provisions 
of the public pillars and the replacement rates achieved in the second pillar. In Australia, 
the replacement rate of the universal pension is set at 25 percent of the average wage for 
single pensioners. If the second pillar achieves a replacement rate of 34 percent, as would 
be the case if the investment return amounts to 3.5 percent, the age pension would be 
reduced to 14 percent of the average wage. But if the second pillar achieves a 
replacement rate of 54 percent, which would result from a 5 percent investment return, 
the public pension would be lowered further to just 6 percent of the average wage. 
 
These calculations imply a severe application of clawback provisions. However, at 
present, this is not the case. Australia applies two tests for the clawbacks.  An income test 
reduces the pension by 40 percent of the excess income above a low income threshold of 
about 6 percent of the average wage (11 percent for couples). And an asset test that used 
to deduct 3 per mil above a high threshold level but since 2007 applies a clawback of 
only 1.5 per mil.   
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Figure 4: Target Replacement Rates 
 
 
Sources: Andersen and Skjodt (2007); Brunner and Thorburn (2008); Buetler and Ruesch (2007); Palmer 
(2008); Rocha and Rudolph (2010); Rocha and Thorburn (2007); and Vittas (2008). 
 
The universal pension in Australia should be eliminated at a relatively low level of 
income (69 percent of the average wage for singles and 115 percent for couples) if the 
tests were strictly applied, but because of the limited use of lifetime income streams and 
the exemption of owner-occupied houses from the asset test, 53 percent of old 
Australians received the full universal pension in 2007. An additional 27 percent received 
a reduced age pension and only 20 percent were not entitled to a public pension. 
However, in the longer run, when the mandatory system will reach maturity, it is likely 
that a growing proportion of retirees will not receive the full age pension. Recipients of 
the full age pension are expected to decline sharply to 38 percent by 2050, while those 
receiving a reduced pension will grow to 40 percent.  
 
In Denmark, the other country that has clawback provisions, the universal pension and 
supplement each amounts to close to 18 percent of average earnings, yielding a combined 
benefit of 35 percent. The clawback rate for both benefits is 30 percent above a threshold 
income. This is about 75 percent of average earnings for the universal pension, but only 
about 16 percent for the supplement.
4 The vast majority of Danish pensioners receive a 
universal pension but a much smaller number are recipients of a supplement. 
 
Figure 4 shows that for a worker on average earnings, a 3.5 percent investment return and 
a contribution rate of 12 percent would produce a replacement rate of 44 percent from the 
second pillar. The combined public benefit would fall to 27 percent. If the investment 
                                                 
4 These threshold levels applied in 2003 (OECD 2007). The levels may vary from year to year because the 
thresholds are set in absolute terms and not in relation to average earnings.   
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return amounts to 5 percent, the replacement rate from the second pillar would equal 70 
percent and the public benefit would fall to 19 percent.
5          
 
Sweden and Switzerland do not apply clawbacks to their main public benefits. As a 
result, the overall replacement rates are quite high, especially in the 5 percent investment 
return scenario. It should, however, be noted that the rules regarding the minimum 
interest rate and the minimum annuity conversion factor that are applied in the mandatory 
second pillar in Switzerland would result in a lower replacement rate of 36 percent in the 
second pillar, at least in the cases of funds that do not provide super-mandatory benefits.    
 
In Chile the new public benefit is a top-up benefit that is paid to retired workers with low 
incomes and low balances. A worker on average earnings with a full contribution record 
would not qualify for the PBS, but would receive a top up benefit (Pension Solidarity 
Supplement) of approximately 3 and 0 percent for portfolios with returns of 3.5 and 5 
percent respectively. Replacement rates from the second pillar will be 38 percent with a 
3.5 percent investment return and 60 percent with a 5 percent investment return. 
 
3. Product  Regulation  and  the Level of Annuitization 
 
The regulation of retirement products and the terms and conditions attached to the use of 
alternative payout options play a major part in the choices that workers make when they 
retire. The offer of public pensions is another major regulatory factor that also affects the 
regulatory framework of payout options from the second pillar. In this section we discuss 
the differences in product regulation and review the prevailing level of annuitization 
across the five countries.  
 
3.1  The Regulation of Payout Options 
 
The five countries covered in this paper have adopted different approaches to the 
regulation of payout options. Australia has the most liberal regime of the five countries 
and Chile the most restrictive. In Denmark and Sweden, the supplementary public 
schemes impose more restrictions than the private plans. Switzerland has a highly 
restrictive regime, although lump sum payments are free from government restrictions 
(Table 6). 
 
                                                 
5 The replacement rates for Denmark are significantly higher than those of the other countries. This 
provides another indication that the assumed average contribution rate of 11 percent to occupational 
pension funds may be too high.  
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Australia  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Chile No*  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Denmark:  ATP  No  No No No  No Yes No 
Denmark: Other  No*  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Sweden:  PPM  No  No No No  No Yes No 
Sweden: Other  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Switzerland Yes  No  No  Yes  No  No  No 
* Restricted lump sums are permitted. 
Sources: Andersen and Skjodt (2007); Brunner and Thorburn (2008); Buetler and Ruesch (2007); Palmer 
(2008); Rocha and Rudolph (2010); Rocha and Thorburn (2007); and Vittas (2008). 
 
Australia imposes no restrictions on payout options from the second pillar. Lump sums, 
term annuities, allocated annuities (which are similar to the Chilean phased withdrawals 
but can be based either on fixed terms or on remaining life expectancy) and various types 
of life annuities are all permitted and left to the choice of individual retirees. The public 
age pension is a life annuity that is indexed to wages. 
 
In Chile, the basic choice until 2004 was among lifetime phased withdrawals (PWs), 
fixed real (inflation indexed) life annuities, and a combination of temporary lifetime PWs 
with deferred life annuities. Since 2004, retiring workers have been allowed to use a 
combination of a minimum pension fixed real annuity and either a phased withdrawal or 
a variable annuity. The PBS is a life annuity that is indexed to prices.  
 
Lump sums are subject to tight restrictions. They are permitted for balances in excess of 
amounts required to provide specified pension benefits. Before 2004, the specified 
pension income was set at 50 percent of the retiree's average real earnings over the 
previous 10 years and 110 percent of the old minimum pension.
6 The 2004 amendments 
to the pension law raised these parameters to 70 and 150 percent respectively and also 
introduced a stricter definition of the average real wage, excluding periods of no 
contributions. The 2008 amendments to the pension law maintain the 70 percent of the 
real average wage requirement, but replaced the minimum pension requirement with an 
80 percent of the PMAS requirement.
7 
 
Workers meeting these conditions can opt for early retirement. This does not preclude 
them from continuing to work. Even workers retiring at the normal age of retirement are 
allowed to continue to work. This is therefore more a "withdrawal of AFP balances" rule 
than a "retirement" provision. However, the potential release of excess balances and 
access to two incomes explains the prevalence of early retirement and the close 
association between annuitization and early retirement.  The tightening of retirement 
conditions in 2004 reduced the proportion of early retirees as a share of total retirees from 
41 to 37 percent between 2004 and 2007. 
 
                                                 
6 The basic solidarity pension has replaced the minimum pension. 
7 This 80 percent requirement becomes effective on 2012.  
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In Denmark, compulsory use of life annuities is imposed for the public ATP fund, except 
in the case of very small balances. The menu of payout options is richer in occupational 
pension plans and includes life annuities, term annuities and lump sums. Available 
options depend on the terms of different collective labor agreements. Tax considerations 
play an important part in shaping individual choices. Public pensions are life annuities 
that are effectively indexed to wages.  
 
In Sweden,  the pattern of payouts is broadly similar to that in Denmark. The main 
difference is that in addition to the public PPM scheme, lump sums are also not permitted 
in the occupational pension schemes. The main choice in occupational plans is between 
life and term annuities. Public pensions from the NDC scheme are life annuities that are 
effectively indexed to wages.  
 
In Switzerland, the basic choice is between lump sums and joint life annuities. The terms 
and conditions of pension plans are left to be determined by their trustees in consultation 
with their sponsors. Term annuities and phased withdrawals as well as deferred annuities 
are not provided for in the government regulations of the mandatory pillar. Lump sums 
are not restricted by government regulations but are subject to plan restrictions. 
Government rules mandate the offer of an option for a lump sum commutation of at least 
25 percent of balances. A 3-year notice is required for the exercise of the lump sum 
option. Public pensions in Switzerland are paid for life and are linked to the average of 
price and wage inflation. 
 
3.2  The Regulation of Life Annuities 
 
In addition to the regulation of payout options, different countries also apply special rules 
to particular products. Of particular interest are the regulations and rules applied to the 
offer of life annuities.  
 
The regulation of life annuities is most pervasive in Switzerland, at least as regards the 
minimum benefits of the mandatory pillar. Switzerland is the only one of the five 
countries that regulates the pricing of annuities.  
 
Annuities from the mandatory part of the occupational pillar must take the form of joint 
life annuities and are subject to a minimum conversion factor. This was set equal to 7.2 
percent of accumulated balances for nearly the first two decades of the scheme, despite 
the intervening fall in interest rates and continuing increase in longevity. The annuity 
conversion factor was lowered after the collapse of investment returns in the first few 
years of the new millennium and is scheduled to fall gradually to 6.8 percent by 2014. 
The stipulation of a minimum annuity conversion factor aimed at protecting workers 
from annual fluctuations of investment returns and interest rates but keeping it unchanged 
for two decades has underscored the pitfalls of price regulation (Buetler and Ruesch 
2007:53).  
 
The same annuity conversion factor is used for men and women as well as married and 
single persons. Women have a longer life expectancy and used to retire at a younger age.  
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But the distortion of applying the same conversion factor to men and women is mitigated 
by the compulsory use of joint life annuities. In addition, the retirement age of women is 
gradually being raised to that of men. Applying the same uniform annuity conversion 
factor to single persons, especially single men, imposes a heavy penalty on them. 




Table 7: Types of Life Annuities 
 Price 
Regulation 
Types and Terms 
Australia  None  Various but little demand 
Chile  None  Prior to 2004: Fixed real annuities; 
 joint life annuities for men; 
option for guaranteed annuities (very popular) 
 
Since 2004: Option of combination of a fixed 
real annuity (at least equal to PBS for normal 
age retirees and above 80% of PMAS and 70% 
of worker’s real wage for early retirees) and 
either a phased withdrawal or a variable 
annuity 
Denmark: ATP  Unisex Life Tables  'Guarantee and Bonus' life annuities 
Longevity and investment risks shared with 
participants   
Denmark: Other  Unisex Life Tables  'Guarantee and Bonus' or 'unit-linked' life 
annuities 
Longevity and investment risks shared with 
participants 
Sweden: PPM  Unisex Life Tables  'Guarantee and Bonus' or 'unit-linked' life 
annuities 
Longevity and investment risks shared with 
participants 
Sweden: Other  Unisex Life Tables  'Guarantee and Bonus' or 'unit-linked' life 
annuities 
Longevity and investment risks shared with 
participants 
Switzerland  Fully regulated  
(minimum annuity 
conversion factor) 
Fixed joint life nominal annuities 
Possibility of bonus 
Sources: Andersen and Skjodt (2007); Brunner and Thorburn (2008); Buetler and Ruesch (2007); Palmer 
(2008); Rocha and Rudolph (2010); Rocha and Thorburn (2007); and Vittas (2008). 
 
Chile also applies an extensive regulation to the use of life annuities. Until 2004, only 
fixed real life annuities (i.e., annuities linked to inflation) and annuities denominated in a 
foreign currency (mainly the US dollar) were permitted. Fixed nominal, escalating and 
variable (bonus-based or unit-linked) annuities as well as term annuities were not 
allowed. However, in 2004 the use of a combination of a fixed real annuity equal to the 
PBS with either a variable annuity or a program of phased withdrawals was authorized. 
Early retirees can opt for a combination of alternatives when the fixed part of the annuity 
                                                 
8 This is probably explained by two factors: single men have a weaker bequest motive; and annuity 
conversion factors in the open market are likely to be significantly lower (Buetler and Ruesch 2007:19, 49).  
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is at least higher than 150 percent of PBS. The market of variable annuities has not 
developed yet. 
 
The use of joint life annuities is compulsory for both spouses.
9 Life annuities with 
guaranteed periods are permitted and are widely used, implying the presence of a strong 
bequest motive. The guaranteed period ranges between 5 and 25 years, with most 
annuitants opting for 10 or 15 years. Deferred life annuities in conjunction with 
temporary phased withdrawals are permitted but are not widely used. Most deferred 
annuities go up to one year. 
 
Insurance companies are required to maintain minimum mathematical reserves based on 
prescribed life tables and technical discount rates and are also subject to capital 
requirements for prudential purposes, but are free to determine their own annuity prices.  
In fact, insurance companies change their annuity prices frequently and oscillate between 
aggressive and passive marketing campaigns.  
 
In Denmark the public ATP offers deferred group life annuities with guaranteed 
minimum benefits and annual bonuses that depend on investment performance and 
longevity experience (Vittas 2008). Guaranteed benefits used to be based on a rate of 
interest of 4.5 percent, but this was lowered to 2 percent for all new contributions in 
2002.  A new scheme was introduced in 2008 that converts annual contributions to 
deferred annuities by using long-term market rates of interest and forward-looking life 
tables.  This applies to 80 percent of the annual contribution.  The remaining 20 percent 
will be used, together with income from investment and hedging operations, to fund 
annual bonuses that will depend on the overall investment performance and longevity 
experience of the fund. 
 
The use of life annuities in occupational plans depends on the terms of different 
collective labor agreements.  Some plans offer deferred group annuities with guaranteed 
annuity conversion factors and allow deductions for the payment of insurance premiums 
for term life and disability insurance but not for lump-sum withdrawals or term annuities. 
Other plans are more flexible and permit lump sums, term annuities or life annuities and 
the latter can be deferred or immediate. The choice of payout options must be indicated at 
the time of contribution and is influenced by the tax treatment of different options, which 
has varied over time.  
 
In occupational plans life annuities can take the form of either policies that offer 
guaranteed benefits, supplemented with annual bonuses that reflect both investment 
returns and longevity experience, or unit-linked policies. The guaranteed rate in 
occupational plans used to be equal to 4.5 percent but was lowered to 2.5 percent in 1994 
and further to 1.5 percent in 1999.  Demand for unit-linked products has increased after 
the fall in guaranteed rates of return but unit-linked premiums still represent a small 
fraction of total contributions. The collective labor agreements determine the calculation 
of initial payments and the distribution of profits between providers and policyholders but 
the calculation of technical reserves for both guaranteed benefits and future bonuses is 
                                                 
9 Until 2008 only married men were required to use joint life annuities.  
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governed by the prudential rules established by the supervisory authority (see section 4.2 
below).   
 
In Sweden,  compulsory use of life annuities is required by the public PPM system. 
Workers have the right, but are not required, to select a joint life annuity. Two types of 
annuities are offered.  
 
The first type is a profit participating annuity with minimum guaranteed benefits and 
annual bonuses that depend on investment performance and also reflect the longevity 
experience of pensioners. In 2006 the guaranteed rate amounted to 2.75 percent, while the 
total rate of return including anticipated bonuses was estimated at 6 percent, but in 2007 
the guaranteed rate was lowered to 0 percent with the intention to increase the potential 
for a higher bonus and a higher total return by investing more aggressively in equities and 
other high-yielding assets.   
 
The PPM uses highly conservative assumptions of future increases in longevity in 
calculating the guaranteed benefits. The assets backing these annuities are transferred 
from worker individual accounts to the PPM, which is responsible for their management. 
PPM has adopted a conservative portfolio that comprises 73 percent bonds and 27 
percent equities.  
 
The second type of life annuity is a unit-linked variable annuity, where the investment 
risk is borne by individual retirees and the longevity risk is shared among the annuitant 
pool. Asset management is decentralized among authorized asset managers as during the 
accumulation phase. Most of the small number of PPM retirees have opted for the unit-
linked product (Palmer 2008:47-48). 
 
Life annuities in occupational plans also take the form of either the traditional 'guarantee 
and bonus' variety or the unit-linked type. However, term annuities for 5 or 10 years are 
permitted and tend to predominate. The calculation of initial payments and the 
declaration of bonuses are governed by the collective labor agreements that cover the 
offer of these variable annuities. However, the maintenance of reserves for the guaranteed 
benefits and for future bonuses is subject to the prudential rules established by the 
supervisory authority.  
 
Denmark and Sweden require the use of unisex life tables in determining annuity 
premiums and conversion factors but annuity providers are otherwise free to set their own 
prices, subject to the terms and conditions stipulated in collective labor agreements.  
 
All types of life annuities are available in Australia which imposes no pricing and product 
restrictions on their providers.   
 
3.3  The Regulation of Term Annuities and Phased Withdrawals 
 
Term annuities are not allowed in the compulsory pillars of Chile and Switzerland. The 
Swiss law does not provide for any type of term annuities (and phased withdrawals) from  
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pension institutions. Recipients of lump sums can in principle purchase such products in 
the open market but are highly unlikely to do so because the terms of life annuities from 
the second pillar are more favorable than products available in the open market. In Chile, 
term annuities are not allowed but lifetime phased withdrawals are provided for and even 
mandated in the case of retiring workers with low balances on their individual accounts. 
 
Term annuities are permitted in Australia, although like all types of annuities their use is 
very limited. Term annuities for up to 25 years are allowed in the occupational plans of 
Denmark and Sweden. These two countries do not have any detailed data on the pattern 
of payouts but available evidence from other sources suggests that the use of term 
annuities of between 5 and 10 years is widespread in occupational pension plans.  
 
In both Denmark and Sweden term annuities take two forms: 'guarantee and bonus 
annuities' and 'unit-linked' annuities. In either case, monthly payments are determined on 
the basis of the term of the annuity and a stipulated interest rate. Then, monthly payments 
are adjusted once a year to reflect the performance of the fund in which the reserves are 
invested. The capital is exhausted at the end of the agreed term. 
 
Phased withdrawals are a form of term annuities.  They differ from them in that they can 
have either a fixed or a variable term and withdrawals can vary on the basis of a specified 
withdrawal rule. Phased withdrawals may follow the fixed benefit rule or the fixed 
percentage benefit rule. The latter is widely used by retirees who adopt self-annuitization 
plans. However, the most important type is the lifetime or life expectancy phased 
withdrawal where the withdrawal fraction is each year set equal to the inverse of the 
remaining life expectancy of the account holder or the remaining joint life expectancy of 
the account holder and spouse if a joint benefit is specified.  
 
Table 8: Types of Term Annuities and Phased Withdrawals 
  Types and Terms 
Australia  Term annuities for 5 to 25 years 
Allocated annuities (lifetime PWs) 
Chile Lifetime  PWs 
Denmark: ATP  Not allowed 
Denmark: Other  Term annuities mainly for 5 to 10 years 
Sweden: PPM  Not allowed 
Sweden: Other  Term annuities mainly for 5 to 10 years 
Switzerland  Not allowed in the mandatory pillar 
Sources: Andersen and Skjodt (2007); Brunner and Thorburn (2008); Buetler and Ruesch (2007); Palmer 
(2008); Rocha and Rudolph (2010); Rocha and Thorburn (2007); and Vittas (2008). 
 
Use of lifetime phased withdrawals is compulsory in Chile for retirees with low account 
balances, i.e., balances that cannot purchase an annuity that is at least equal to the PBS.  
In these cases, the monthly withdrawal equals the PBS and when the account balance is 
exhausted, the government steps in and takes responsibility for continuing payments for 
the remaining life of beneficiaries. The 2008 amendments to the pension law require the 
creation of reserves in individual accounts that cover a much higher than average life 
expectancy. This will lower the probability of triggering the PBS and limit the exposure  
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of the government. This change is likely to reduce the relative attractiveness of PWs 
compared to annuities. 
 
The rate of return and the life tables that pension companies must use in calculating the 
annual benefits of phased withdrawals are prescribed by the authorities.  This is linked to 
the need to prevent abuse of the minimum pension guarantee, since use of an overly 
generous rate of return and inappropriate life tables in calculating the annual benefit from 
PWs could accelerate the depletion of account balances and expose the government to 
larger PBS payments.  
 
Phased withdrawals are known as allocated annuities in Australia. They are either life 
expectancy phased withdrawals similar to those used in Chile or fixed term.  The latter is 
often set equal to life expectancy at retirement.  Allocated annuities are fundamentally 
investment products, placed in a wide array of instruments, ranging from capital 
guaranteed products to market-linked funds. Their balances fluctuate with changes in 
investment performance.  They provide considerable flexibility and access to funds but 
offer no protection against longevity risk. 
 
Although the choice of payout options has not been restricted in Australia, allocated 
annuities have been subject to specified rules and restrictions.  Until 2007 allocated 
annuities were subject to both a minimum and a maximum annuity conversion factor.  
For a 65 year old beneficiary, the minimum annuity conversion factor was 6.37 percent in 
1998, while the maximum equaled 12.35 percent.
10  The maximum and minimum limits 
decreased as people grew older.  The maximum payment per year aimed at ensuring that 
the account balance would not be exhausted before reaching age 80, while the minimum 
payment was the account balance divided by life expectancy at that age.   
 
The imposition of a minimum limit aimed at limiting the use of tax-advantaged savings 
by wealthy retirees and was similar in spirit to the minimum distributions imposed on 
IRA accounts in the US.  On the other hand, the imposition of a maximum limit on the 
annuity conversion factor was not very meaningful in the context of permitting free 
withdrawals of accumulated balances in the form of lump sums.  Changes in the 
regulations that were implemented in 2007 removed the maximum and lowered the 
minimum limits.  The new minimum limit for a 65 year old beneficiary is 5 percent.  
 
3.4  The Regulation of Marketing 
 
With the notable exception of Chile and to a lesser extent Denmark, life insurance 
companies have not undertaken aggressive campaigns in marketing annuities. This is 
clearly related to the weak demand for voluntary life annuities in most countries, which is 
primarily explained by the presence of social security and company pensions.  In most 
countries, life insurance companies focus their marketing activities on promoting life 
insurance and investment products, including the offer of retirement savings facilities.  
 
                                                 
10 In the relevant tables, the minimum pension factor was expressed as a divisor and equaled 15.7 for the 
minimum and 8.1 for the maximum benefit (Knox 2000:25).   
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Because of the limited marketing effort, the regulation of marketing annuities and other 
options during the payout phase has lagged behind the regulation of saving products in 
the accumulation phase in all countries except Chile.  
 
In Australia, the marketing and selling of annuity products is subject to the same conduct 
rules, such as the "know-your-customer" rule and adequate disclosure of the terms and 
conditions of different products. There is no requirement to offer a minimum number of 
annuity options or to disclose the level of commissions received from different 
companies.  
 
In Denmark and Sweden there is little individual choice in the selection of annuity 
provider, which is often determined in the collective labor agreement that sets the terms 
and conditions of different pension plans. Marketing activity is targeted at the trustees of 
different plans who may decide to transfer the whole plan to another provider. Life 
insurance companies and other pension institutions compete by attracting attention to 
their investment performance record, their bonus distribution policies, and the allocation 
of profits between shareholders and policyholders.  
 
Marketing activity per se is subject to little regulation, other than observance of typical 
conduct rules, which are more relevant for the offer of payout options in personal pension 
plans. Insurance companies and pension funds are free to set their own prices but, under 
European Union law, they are required to use unisex life tables in calculating annuity 
prices. Perhaps because the offer of most variable annuities is governed by collective 
labor agreements where representatives of employers and workers monitor the 
performance of providers and protect the interests of workers, neither country has so far 
created a central register with a systematic compilation of performance data on different 
providers. The complexity of collective labor agreements, which cover many types of 
benefits, has also impeded the development of a central database. A central register of 
performance data would be indispensable in a system of non-employer-based individual 
accounts.   
 
In Switzerland, the scope for marketing is even more limited since the pricing of 
annuities in the obligatory part of the second pillar is subject to federal regulation. The 
same annuity conversion factor is used for men and women, although women live longer 
and retire earlier than men,
11 and also for joint and single life annuities, even though joint 
life annuities have a much higher probability of continuing to make payments for a longer 
period.  General conduct rules apply in the case of voluntary personal pension plans. 
 
Chile is the exception among the five countries, probably because of the central role 
played by open market annuities in the provision of retirement income after the closing 
down of the social security system to new entrants and the granting of recognition bonds 
to workers who joined the private pension pillar. 
 
 
                                                 
11 As already noted, the normal retirement age of women is gradually being raised to that of men. But 
women continue to have a longer life expectancy than men.   
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Table 9: Marketing Regulation 
  Types and Terms 
Australia  Occupational plans are not active providers of annuities. 
 Marketing of annuities is subject to ordinary conduct rules. 
Chile . 
 
Licensing requirements for pension advisors. 
Caps on broker commissions. 
Electronic quotation system. 
Denmark: ATP  No marketing is involved.   
Denmark: Other  Annuities are provided through occupational plans. 
Marketing focuses on enhancing brand names, competition 
for mandates, declaration of bonuses. 
Sweden: PPM  No marketing is involved other than creation of brand 
names by decentralized asset managers. 
Sweden: Other  Annuities are provided through occupational plans. 
Marketing focuses on enhancing brand names, competition 
for mandates, declaration of bonuses. 
Switzerland Annuities  are provided through occupational plans. 
Little marketing is involved in view of federal regulation of 
products and prices. 
Sources: Andersen and Skjodt (2007); Brunner and Thorburn (2008); Buetler and Ruesch (2007); Palmer 
(2008); Rocha and Rudolph (2010); Rocha and Thorburn (2007); and Vittas (2008). 
 
However, the marketing of the two main payout options, phased withdrawals and life 
annuities, is highly asymmetrical and one-sided. The pension companies (AFPs) focus on 
the very profitable accumulation phase of the pension business and adopt a passive 
marketing stance on phased withdrawals. The commission income that pension 
companies can raise from offering phased withdrawals is a modest fee of around 1 
percent of benefit payments, whereas the fees during the accumulation phase, excluding 
premiums for term life and disability insurance, still amount to close to 15 percent of 
contribution amounts.  
 
In contrast, life insurance companies engage in very active marketing of annuities, using 
employees and company agents as well as independent brokers. They have strong 
incentives to market annuities, which represent the core of their business. Pension 
advisors play an important part not only in the choice of the annuity option but also in the 
decision to retire early.
12 During the 1990s when commissions paid to brokers reached 
very high levels of 5 to 6 percent of the value of the annuity contract, brokers reportedly 
offered kickbacks to their clients, effectively increasing the amount of funds that early 
retirees could withdraw as lump sums.  
 
Chile applies an extensive regulation of marketing activity in the annuity market. Pension 
advisors have to pass a certification test administered by the supervisory agency as well 
as a basic 'fit and proper' test. Most applicants take a course on annuities that comprises a 
total of 120 hours. Licensed pension advisors are legally obligated to represent their 
clients and generate their income from commissions on the sale of annuities. They are not 
                                                 
12 In 2008, brokers were replaced by pension advisors. Stricter certification requirements have been 
imposed.   
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permitted to accept volume-related remuneration from insurers. However, they are not 
required to disclose the level of commissions they receive from different insurers. 
Pension advisors do not have a self regulatory body that may sanction or enforce a code 
of good practices on its associates.
13  
 
Regulators were concerned during the 1990s with the bias in favor of early retirement, 
the dispersion of annuity prices, the high level of commissions and the spread of illegal 
marketing practices, such as the cash rebates. New rules were adopted in the 2004 and 
2008 revisions of the pension system: the conditions for early retirement were tightened; 
a cap of 2 percent was imposed on annuity commissions; banks were allowed to 
participate in the distribution of annuities; the menu of retirement products was expanded 
by allowing use of phased withdrawals or variable annuities in combination with fixed 
real annuities for higher income individuals; and a new electronic quotation system was 
introduced. 
 
The new quotation system, known as Sistema de Consultas y Ofertas de Montos de 
Pension (SCOMP), has attracted particular interest because it represents an attempt to 
reduce the influence of brokers in the selection of annuities. The aim is to enhance the 
quality of information available to consumers as well as to enable direct access to a full 
range of annuity quotations. Quotations are solicited through SCOMP participants, while 
SCOMP validates the personal data of the workers concerned. SCOMP receives 
quotations from insurers and also calculates the PW and sends this information to the 
applicants. Workers can select one of the offers made within 15 days or seek another 
offer outside SCOMP but only from an insurer who made an offer under SCOMP. The 
offer made outside SCOMP must be better than the first offer. In addition to the quotation 
system itself, a list of all potential retirees, including those reaching normal retirement 
age and those eligible for early retirement, is prepared and circulated to all SCOMP 
participants (brokers, insurance companies and AFPs). This reduces further the influence 
of individual brokers. However, workers who object to the circulation of their personal 
data can have their names removed from this list. 
 
3.5  Level of Annuitization 
 
It is difficult to ascertain with a reasonable degree of precision the level of annuitization 
in different countries because adequately detailed data are not available.  In principle, we 
are interested to know the proportion of people who opt for lump sums, the proportion 
that buy life annuities, and the proportion who use phased withdrawals. In practice, 
however, people may use a combination of payout options, withdrawing part of their 
balances in lump sums and using the remainder for life annuities or phased withdrawals. 
In these cases, a weight reflecting the allocation of balances to each payout option could 
be used but the information that would be required for making these computations is not 
available. An alternative approach is to use the proportion of the total accumulated 
balances of retiring workers that is allocated to each option, but this information also is 
not published in any of the five countries. 
 
                                                 
13 The Colegio de Corredores de Seguros de Chile does not operate as an SRO.  
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Figure 5 shows our estimates of the level of annuitization in different countries. There is 
100 percent annuitization with universal coverage from the public pillars, including in the 
case of Denmark and Sweden the supplementary public ATP and PPM schemes and in 
the case of Chile the PBS. The level of public benefits is between 30 and 40 percent of 
average earnings in Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland. In Australia, it is lower because 
only half of pensioners receive the full age pension. And in Chile it is around 17 percent 
for recipients of the PBS.  
 
Figure 5: Level of Life Annuitization 













Australia Chile Denmark Sweden Switzerland
Public  Pensions Private Pillar
 
Sources: Andersen and Skjodt (2007); Brunner and Thorburn (2008); Buetler and Ruesch (2007); Palmer 
(2008); Rocha and Rudolph (2010); Rocha and Thorburn (2007); and Vittas (2008). 
 
 
Despite the imposition of mandatory or quasi-mandatory participation in funded second 
pillars, the level of annuitization of accumulated savings in the second pillar varies 
considerably across the five countries. This mostly reflects differences in the menu of 
permitted payout options, while the menu itself reflects the level of benefits from the 
public pillars (which take the form of pensions for life and are thus equivalent to full 
annuitization).  In addition to the menu of permitted payouts, the level of annuitization 
also reflects other factors such as risk aversion, clawback provisions, tax incentives, and 
the terms and conditions of annuities. 
 
The estimated level of annuitization from the second pillar is highest in Switzerland at 80 
percent, followed by Chile at 70 percent. It is very low in Australia at less than 10 
percent. It is probably 50 percent in Denmark and less than 30 percent in Sweden.  
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Table 10: Level of Annuitization in the Second Pillar  
 Level  of  annuitization 
(percent of balances) 
Comments 
Australia Very  low 
 




Lump sums are allowed without restrictions and account for 
55% of all payouts from superannuation funds.  Retirees also 







Lump sums are restricted.  The share of annuitants in total 
retirees exceeds 60% overall, and exceeds 70% excluding 
disability and survivor pensioners.   









ATP: mandatory annuitization, except for very low balances.
 
 Occupational schemes: annuitization depends on the terms of 
collective labor agreements.  Average level of annuitization is 
relatively high, based on choices made during contribution 
period: 50% of contributions are allocated to life annuities, 35% 











PPM: mandatory annuitization 
 
Occupational schemes: annuitization depends on the terms of 
collective labor agreements.  Lump sums are not permitted in 
occupational plans, but extensive use is made of term annuities 







Lump sums are allowed, but joint life annuities are favored by 
the terms and conditions of annuities.  
Sources: Andersen and Skjodt (2007); Brunner and Thorburn (2008); Buetler and Ruesch (2007); Palmer 
(2008); Rocha and Rudolph (2010); Rocha and Thorburn (2007); and Vittas (2008). 
  
In Chile there are data on the numbers of retirees who opt for life annuities or phased 
withdrawals and estimates of the proportion of accumulated balances that are converted 
into life annuities. Including deferred annuities, 62 percent of pensioners selected life 
annuities in 2004. However, excluding disability and survivor pensioners, who are 
covered by group disability and term life insurance and have no choice in the matter, the 
share of retirees who selected annuitization rises to 71 percent.  No data are published on 
the size of accumulated balances that are used for PWs and thus there are no published 
data on the share of accumulated balances that is annuitized. However, this proportion is 
also likely to be close to 70 percent. 
 
Most annuities are joint life annuities, reflecting the regulation that forces married males 
to take this type of annuity. The share of annuities with guaranteed periods is large and 
most of these annuities are guaranteed for periods of 10-15 years and even longer. The 
strong demand for guaranteed annuities reveals a preference for bequests.  
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There is a very strong association between annuitization and early retirement in Chile. 90 
percent of early retirees buy annuities and only 10 percent use PWs. In contrast, 65 
percent of normal age retirees use PWs and only 35 percent purchase annuities. 60 
percent of all annuitants are early retirees and only 15 percent are normal age retirees (the 
remainder are disabled retirees and survivors). If disability and survivors are excluded, 
the share of early retirees in the stock of annuities increases to 80 percent. 
 
Several factors explain the high level of annuitization and its relation to early retirement. 
First, restrictions on lump-sums have increased the demand for all retirement products, 
including life annuities. Second, the demand for life annuities has been stimulated by the 
absence of a front-ended public pillar benefit, while the back-ended MPG has provided a 
low level of protection to middle and high income retirees. Third, the marketing of 
retirement products has been highly asymmetric. AFPs have focused on the accumulation 
phase of the pension business and have not marketed PWs actively. In contrast, life 
insurance companies have depended on the annuity business and have marketed their 
products aggressively. Insurance brokers obtain their income from commissions on 
annuity premiums. They have targeted their marketing efforts primarily to higher income 
workers, frequently inducing these workers to retire early and annuitize. Brokers do not 
receive any commission from a client or provider when a PW is used. 
 
In Switzerland, there are no official statistics on the level of annuitization in the second 
pillar. Published data show the level of annual benefits, divided between annuity 
payments and capital (lump-sum) payments, but do not report the proportion of 
accumulated capital of newly retired workers (both under the mandatory and super-
mandatory parts of the system) that is withdrawn as a lump sum and the part that is 
converted into a life annuity. They also do not report the number of new retirees who 
convert all their accumulated capital into an annuity, those who withdraw the total 
capital, and those who withdraw a fraction of the available capital and convert the rest.  
 
Lump-sum payments have fluctuated over the years between 15 and 20 percent of all 
benefit payments. This would imply that the level of annuitization is between 80 and 85 
percent. The same broad level would also be obtained if the size of accumulated balances 
of retiring workers is estimated on the basis of the change in annual pension payments 
and applying to them the inverse of the regulated annuity conversion factor.
14 This 
calculation shows that lump-sum payments represent between 20 and 25 percent of the 
total value of balances of retiring workers. On the basis of these calculations it would 
thus be reasonable to assume that the level of annuitization in the second pillar amounts 
to 80 percent. 
 
This would be a high level of annuitization, coming on top of the full annuitization of 
first pillar benefits. This high level is attributed to the way pension plans are structured. 
Although there are no government restrictions on lump-sum payments, the rules of most 
pension funds, which are determined jointly by employer and worker representatives, 
                                                 
14 This rough calculation overlooks two offsetting factors: any increase due to inflation adjustment in 
pensions in payment and the termination of pension payments to deceased pensioners.  
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appear to favor annuitization.
15 The existing strong link between the accumulation and 
decumulation phases of the second pillar, where both are with the same sponsor with 
almost no exceptions, has reinforced the preference for life annuities.  
 
In some plans individuals are allowed to cash out their old-age savings and could, in 
principle, purchase another annuity contract in the open market. In practice, virtually no 
one does that. This is mainly because occupational pension plans offer two advantages 
over open market annuities. First, they are not affected by adverse selection problems. 
And second, and far more importantly, the regulated annuity conversion factor has been 
much higher than what could be obtained in the open market.
16  
 
In Denmark ATP balances must be converted into life annuities, except for very small 
account balances, which are paid out as lump sums. The level of annuitization in 
occupational pension plans depends on the rules specified in different collective labor 
agreements.  Detailed data on payouts are not available but the level of planned 
annuitization can be gauged from choices made at the time of contribution. This is 
required for tax purposes. Available data indicate that 50 percent of contributions were 
allocated to life annuities in 2004, down from 60 percent in 2000. The use of lump sums 
fell from 30 to 15 percent, while demand for term annuities rose from 10 to 35 percent 
There is a possibility of additional immediate or deferred annuitization at retirement but 
no information on this is available (Andersen and Skjodt 2007:4-21).  
 
In Sweden use of life annuities is compulsory for the public PPM scheme. Lump sums 
are not permitted in occupational plans, but extensive use is made of term annuities for 5 
or 10 years. As in Denmark, there are no data on payouts, but Palmer (2008:22) 
calculates that replacement rates for workers over 75 fall drastically to 58 percent of 
income at age 65 compared to 74 percent for retirees aged between 65 and 74. While 
other factors may explain part of this decline, Palmer infers that this is mainly due to the 
extensive use of term annuities from occupational pension plans. Use of life annuities is 
likely to be low, although no detailed data are available.  
 
The level of annuitization is low in Australia but it is very difficult to obtain reliable 
estimates of the actual use of lifetime income streams. Readily available data show that 
lump sums have been declining steadily in recent years as a proportion of total benefits 
and pension payments have correspondingly increased. From a level of nearly 20 percent 
in 2002, pension payments rose to 45 percent of total benefit payments in 2007.  
 
There are large differences in the composition of benefit payments across different types 
of pension funds. Pension payments accounted for 69 percent of total benefits in public 
pension funds in 2007, but they represented 30 percent in retail funds and had even 
smaller shares in corporate and industry funds.  
                                                 
15 However, many pension funds, especially of small companies, allow the entire capital to be withdrawn 
on retirement. 
16 Arguably, the regulated high annuity conversion factor has compensated workers for the lower than 
market returns that have been earned during the accumulation phase, at least during the first twenty years of 
the operation of the second pillar.  
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The large majority of pension payments involves term and allocated income streams that 
are not paid for life. Allocated and term annuities have been far more popular than life 
annuities and have accounted for more than 80 percent of all balances invested in regular 
income streams. Assets backing life annuities represent less than 2 percent of the total 
assets of life insurers and correspond to less than 0.5 percent of GDP. 
 
The preference for lump sums has been reinforced by the clawback provisions of the age 
pension. The age pension is subject to both income and asset tests. However, for a 
number of years in the 1970s and 1980s, the asset test had been suspended, encouraging 
retirees to opt for lump sums and avoid regular income streams. Even after its 
reintroduction, the asset test is significantly less onerous than the income test. The 
preference for lump sums also reflects a strong inclination for greater control and 
flexibility in financial management and for reliance on self-annuitization. 
 
In summary, the main factors that have affected the level of annuitization have been 
restrictions on lump-sum payments and other payout options, the presence and rules of 
public schemes, the intensity of marketing and the prevailing mentality.  
 
Restrictions can be legal restrictions imposed by government or plan restrictions applied 
by the sponsors and trustees of occupational plans. The presence and rules of public 
schemes play an importan part as shown by the experience of the zero and first pillars 
everywhere and by the experience of the ATP in Denmark and the PPM in Sweden. The 
absence of a public pillar pension for middle and high income workers in Chile is a 
notable factor.  An important third factor is the intensity of marketing activity, which has 
been underscored by the role of insurance brokers in Chile. Finally, culture and tradition 
also play their part. This is highlighted by the prevailing pension mentality in Switzerland 
in sharp contrast to the lump-sum mentality in Australia.  
 
In the case of Chile, the more restrictive menu is justified, given the key role of the 
second pillar. Inflation indexed life annuities protect against investment, inflation, and 
longevity risks, while joint life annuities for married couples extend longevity insurance 
to spouses. The more liberal rules for occupational schemes in Denmark and Sweden also 
seem justified, given the high level of annuitization in the zero and first pillars and in the 
public schemes in the second pillars of the two countries. Use of short term annuities 
allows higher payouts in the first years of retirement. This responds to public demand, 
especially in countries that have well developed national health systems. 
 
The very high level of annuitization in Switzerland is partly explained by restrictions on 
lump-sum payments in plan rules that may have led to over-annuitization. The recent 
government regulation that introduced an obligation to pension plans to offer an option of 
a minimum 25 percent lump-sum payment is probably a response to public demand and 
an attempt to correct the emphasis on annuitization. 
 
The Australian case is more intriguing.  The strong role and rapid growth of the second 
pillar would call for some restrictions on lump-sum payments and for a greater promotion  
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of annuitization. There is an inherent contradiction in mandating workers to save for 
retirement during their working lives but allowing unrestricted access to lump sums in 
retirement. However, the historical application of clawback provisions for the universal 
pension has encouraged the emergence of a so-called lump-sum mentality, while the 
public has shown a strong preference for flexibility and financial control over retirement 
wealth.  
 
3.6  The Value of Annuities and Money Worth's Ratios 
 
Money worth's ratios (MWRs) measure the value of an annuity to its purchaser at the 
time the annuity is bought. The MWR is defined as the ratio of the expected value of 
benefits payable under the contract to the paid premium. A cohort life table and an 
interest rate yield curve are required to calculate the present value of promised benefits. 
 
MWRs are calculated by using two life tables, one covering the general population and 
the other the population of annuitants, and two interest rate yield curves, one based on 
risk-free interest rates on government bonds and the other on interest rates on corporate 
bonds. In most countries, calculations are based on annuity quotes since data on sold 
annuities are not readily available. Chile is a major exception because it has a very rich 
database on sold annuities.  
 
The calculation based on the population of annuitants and corporate bond rates reflects 
the expected longevity experience of annuitants and the risk of insurance insolvency 
faced by them, especially when insurance companies invest primarily in corporate bonds. 
However, country comparisons are often focused on calculations based on the general 
population and government bond rates because the underlying data are more reliable. 
Moreover, in countries where the corporate bond market is underdeveloped and insurers 
invest primarily in government bonds, use of the risk-free rate would be more 
appropriate. Use of the risk-free rate would also be appropriate when governments 
guarantee annuity payments, at least up to the level of the government guaranteed 
benefits. 
 
A MWR that is close to unity, perhaps around 0.97, would indicate an efficient and 
competitive annuity market that offers fair prices to annuitants. This would allow for a 3 
percent load factor to cover commissions paid to brokers and other expenses as well as 
risk premiums and profit margins. In most countries where such calculations have been 
made, MWRs based on the annuitant population and government bond (risk-free) rates 
have been higher or close to this level. But MWRs based on corporate bond rates have 
been significantly below this level. This has reflected higher load factors because of 
higher expenses and higher risk premiums resulting from greater uncertainty about future 
longevity and asset/liability mismatching. 
 
In the country studies commissioned for this project and presented in the papers listed in 
footnote 1, MWRs were calculated for only two countries, Chile and Switzerland, and in 
the latter case, only for annuities from the mandatory component of the second pillar. In 
Australia, the very small size of the annuity market did not warrant a detailed calculation  
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of MWRs, while in Denmark and Sweden the calculation was impeded by the lack of 
data on ex ante and ex post bonus payments. Without detailed data on bonus payments, 
the calculation of MWRs, based only on minimum guaranteed benefits, would have been 
meaningless. 
 
The calculated MWRs are very high in both Chile and Switzerland. Joint life indexed 
annuities in Chile had a MWR of 1.078 in March 2004 when discounted by the 
government bond yield curve and based on cohort annuitant tables. However, this fell to 
0.892 when corporate bond rates were used (Rocha and Thorburn 2007:172).  
 
In Switzerland, the MWR for joint life nominal annuities of the second pillar amounted to 
1.152 in 2004 when discounted by the government bond yield curve. The very high 
MWR reflects the use of a fixed annuity conversion factor of 7.2 percent at a time of very 
low interest rates. In 2000, when interest rates were much higher, the MWR stood at 
1.025 (the five-year bond rate equaled 3.80 percent in 2000 against 2.36 percent in 2004).  
 
Table 11: Money's Worth Ratios  
Country 
 
Joint Life Annuities 
Cohort Annuitant Tables 
Government Bond Rates 
Joint Life Annuities 
Cohort Annuitant Tables 
Corporate Bond Rates 
Indexed    
Chile 2004  1.078  0.892 
UK 0.880   
    
Nominal    
Switzerland 2004  1.152   
Switzerland 2000  1.025   
Switzerland* 0.985  0.875 
UK* 0.987  0.873 
US* 0.929  0.841 
Canada* 0.980  0.868 
* See Rocha and Thorburn (2007:173) for details. 
Source: Buetler and Ruesch (2007) and Rocha and Thorburn (2007). 
 
The MWRs in Chile and Switzerland compare favorably with those prevailing in other 
countries and indicate that they may not be sustainable in the longer run (Table 11). 
Switzerland has already decided to lower gradually the uniform annuity conversion factor 
in its second pillar, while use of improved mortality data and greater appreciation of the 
long-term risks of annuities may contribute to a lowering of MWRs in Chile.        
 
4. Provider  Regulation 
 
The regulation of providers of retirement products covers both the providers of annuities 
(which are usually life insurance companies) and the providers of phased withdrawals 
(which are usually the pension institutions that handle the accumulation accounts). The 
regulatory framework includes the institutional structure of the market, the regulation of 
investments, and capital regulations. The latter relate to the valuation of assets, the 
measurement of liabilities and the application of risk-based capital rules. Investment and 
capital regulations aim to ensure the solvency of annuity providers and play a crucial part  
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in protecting the interests of policyholders. This section also discusses country 
approaches to risk management and risk sharing. 
 
4.1 Institutional  Structure 
 
Most countries have adopted a competitive decentralized institutional structure where 
multiple pension institutions and life insurance companies compete in the provision of 
retirement products, subject to the product regulations and restrictions on payout options 
discussed in the preceding section. In Chile, only institutions specializing in life 
insurance and pension fund administration are authorized to offer retirement products. 
These institutions are set up as profit seeking institutions. In the other four countries, 
participating institutions also include not-for-profit mutual groups, such as industry funds 
in Australia, multi-employer pension funds in Denmark and Sweden, and pension 
foundations in Switzerland. 
 
Sweden, and to a lesser extent, Denmark have also created a centralized structure for a 
significant component of their retirement systems. Sweden established a centralized 
structure for the funded component of its public pillar. Centralized administration lowers 
operating costs because of scale economies and avoidance of high marketing costs, while 
the centralized offer of life annuities benefits from using a larger customer base and thus 
more efficient risk pooling. The centralized institution, the PPM, is a state institution. 
 
During the accumulation phase, the PPM offers centralized administration, while asset 
management is decentralized among a large number of approved asset managers that 
offer an even larger number of investment funds.  The selection of asset managers and 
investment funds is made by individual participants. The PPM collects all individual 
mandates and transfers funds to the asset managers without revealing the names of their 
clients.  
 
During the payout phase, retiring workers are compelled to use the life annuities offered 
by the PPM on a centralized basis. Two types of life annuities are provided: profit 
participating annuities with minimum guaranteed benefits and annual bonuses; and unit-
linked annuities. The first are managed centrally by the PPM, which assumes the 
investment risk of guaranteed benefits but declares annual bonuses on the basis of 
investment performance and longevity experience. For unit-linked annuities a similar 
pattern is used to that of the accumulation phase: centralized administration, including 
centralized longevity risk pooling, by the PPM and decentralized asset management, 
based on decisions of individual annuitants. Retirees bear the investment and longevity 
risk, the latter through risk pooling with other annuitants.  
 
The institutional structure of the four main occupational funds (for salaried employees, 
blue-collar workers, local government employees, and civil servants) follows a similar 
pattern as the PPM. There is a central agency in each plan to collect contributions and 
organize benefits and there are decentralized asset managers who are chosen by workers 
who opt for unit-linked annuities. The main difference is that occupational plan benefits 
are for the most part provided in the form of 5 or 10-year term annuities.  
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Table 12: Institutional Structure 
  Types and Terms 
Australia Decentralized  competitive structure. 
High operating costs and fees in retail funds. 
Weak marketing of life annuities.  
Chile  Competitive but highly concentrated structure in 
accumulation phase and PWs. 
High operating fees and profit margins. 
Competitive decentralized structure for life annuities. 
Price competition and high MWRs. 
Denmark: ATP  Centralized administration and asset management during 
both accumulation and payout phase.  
Denmark: Other  Decentralized structure. 
Competition for plan mandates among multi-employer 
funds and life insurance companies. 
Accumulation and payout phase by same institution 
subject to pension plan rules. 
Sweden: PPM  Centralized administration but decentralized asset 
management during accumulation phase. 
Centralized administration, longevity risk-pooling and asset 
management for traditional annuities. 
Centralized administration and longevity risk-pooling but 
decentralized asset management for unit-linked annuities. 
Sweden: Other  Four large multi-employer schemes with similar structure to 
PPM. 
Switzerland Decentralized  and fragmented structure among foundations 
and insurance companies. 
Accumulation and payout phase by same institution 
governed by pension plan rules. 
Pervasive product and price regulations. 
Sources: Andersen and Skjodt (2007); Brunner and Thorburn (2008); Buetler and Ruesch (2007); Palmer 
(2008); Rocha and Rudolph (2010); Rocha and Thorburn (2007); and Vittas (2008). 
 
Denmark follows a mixed approach. In the case of the ATP, the supplementary public 
fund, account administration, risk pooling and asset management are all centralized. But 
in occupational and personal pension plans, there is a high degree of decentralization. In 
occupational pension plans, much depends on the rules of collective labor agreements. 
Insurance companies and multi-employer pension funds compete for winning 
occupational mandates. Individual workers have limited choice. Most insurance 
companies are profit-seeking commercial entities but multi-employer pension funds and 
some insurance companies are organized as mutual not-for-profit institutions. In 
Denmark and Sweden, the determination of annual bonuses and the distribution of net 
investment returns between policyholders and shareholders is an important issue. 
 
Switzerland has a highly decentralized structure and its system suffers from a high degree 
of fragmentation, reflecting the presence of a large number of pension funds. However, 
the extensive product and price regulation of the payout phase limits the scope for 
competition and excessive spending on marketing campaigns, while pension plan rules 
restrict the choice of individual workers, during both the accumulation and payout 
phases. The only workers in the mandatory pillar who have individual choice are those  
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who decide to commute to a lump sum a substantial part or the totality of their pension 
balances. 
 
Australia probably has the most decentralized structure with large numbers of insurance 
companies and superannuation funds competing in a market that is not constrained by 
pervasive product and price controls. Some of the institutions are single-employer or 
multi-employer funds that operate as not-for-profit entities, while a significant number 
are set as master trusts, owned and operated by profit-seeking financial groups. Retail 
funds operate with high operating costs and fees, which result in significantly lower net 
investment returns. The apparent preference of retiring workers for lump sums limits the 
potential for aggressive marketing campaigns in the selling of life annuities.  Pension 
institutions focus on promoting allocated annuities, which are effectively investment 
products. The use of life annuities declined in recent years from very low levels, even 
though the share of lump sums in total benefit payments also experienced a fall. Term 
and allocated annuities have experienced significant increases. 
 
Chile has a system that is based on a competitive decentralized structure. Pension fund 
administrators and life insurance companies are established as profit-seeking commercial 
undertakings. There is strong competition among a small number of authorized pension 
companies (AFPs) in the accumulation market and among a larger number of insurance 
companies in the annuity market. This has resulted in large marketing costs, mostly 
taking the form of high commissions paid to agents and brokers. However, a growing 
consolidation of the two markets, which is much more pronounced among pension 
administrators, the threat of regulation, and the adoption of informal agreements among 
competing institutions in the two main segments of the market have resulted in a major 
containment of marketing costs. AFPs operate with high operating fees and high profit 
margins. Life insurance companies engage in greater price competition which has 
resulted in thinner margins and high MWRs. 
 
As a mechanism to induce price competition in the accumulation phase, a recent change 
in the regulation requires all new entrants to the pension system to be allocated through a 
public auction and for a period of two years to the pension fund that levies the lowest fee. 
The winner has to offer the same fee to the rest of its affiliates. The first auction took 
place in February 2010 and the winner offered a fee that was 24 percent lower than the 
weighted average fee of the industry. Interestingly, the winner was a new pension fund 
administrator that did not face the high marginal cost that lowering operating fees to 
existing affiliates would have implied. 
 
4.2  Capital and Prudential Regulations 
 
Financial institutions used to be subject to highly restrictive investment regulations in 
most countries around the world. Ostensibly the regulations had a prudential objective, 
but in practice this was often mixed with fiscal and macroeconomic objectives. In 
general, investment regulations have not been binding and have been significantly 
liberalized over time. Investment regulations have a greater impact on annuity providers  
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because of the paramount importance of avoiding asset and liability mismatching. 
However, this issue has increasingly been tackled by capital and prudential regulations.  
 
The capital and prudential regulation of providers of retirement products depends on the 
type of products they offer and the risks they assume. They have a greater impact on 
fixed nominal or real annuities where providers assume the investment and longevity 
risks. They are less onerous for products that transfer the risk to pensioners.  
 
In the case of phased withdrawals, where pensioners assume both the investment and 
longevity risks, the capital regulation is relatively simple. This is clearly shown by the 
experience of the Chilean pension companies (AFPs), which are not allowed to offer 
annuities and can only provide phased withdrawals. In contrast, the capital regulation of 
annuity providers is much more complex.  It depends on the particular features of the 
types of annuities that are offered (fixed or variable, nominal or real, with or without 
guaranteed periods, with or without deferment periods) and on the types of risk-sharing 
arrangements that are used. According to the 2008 amendments to the pension law, 
pension fund administrators need to build reserves to account for the probability that 
individuals may trigger the minimum return guarantee. The formula for calculating PW   
includes a fair actuarial factor, which translates into reserve accumulation. 
 
Chile is the first country in the world that has mandated for the second pillar the use of 
retirement products with regular income streams over the expected life of beneficiaries 
(in the form of life annuities or lifetime phased withdrawals). As a result, it has 
introduced a rigorous regulatory regime on providers of retirement products to minimize 
the bankruptcy risk faced by pensioners. It has also introduced state guarantees to protect 
pensioners against provider insolvency as well as aberrant behavior.  
 
The capital regulation of pension companies includes a stipulated minimum capital that 
rises with the number of beneficiaries but is generally low and does not act as a barrier to 
entry. For an AFP with 10,000 members or more, the minimum capital amounts to 20,000 
UF or about 800,000 USD. A more stringent capital requirement is the obligatory reserve 
(encaje) of 1 percent of the value of assets under management. The encaje was initially 
set equal to 5 percent of assets but this was found to be excessive and was quickly 
lowered to the current level. This is similar to the capital requirement imposed on 
insurance companies for their unit-linked business. 
 
The encaje is required to be invested in units of the same fund(s) in order to ensure an 
alignment of interests between the pension companies and their members. The encaje is 
designed to support the minimum relative rate of return guarantee that Chilean AFPs are 
required to observe. The guarantee initially specified that the average real rate of return 
of any company could not be lower than 50 percent of the average of all AFPs over the 
preceding 12 months. The period of calculation was later extended to 36 months and was 
then applied to each of the five funds that AFPs were required to offer, while the spread 
below the average was differentiated by type of fund, being higher for the more volatile 
A and B funds. The encaje and the minimum relative return guarantee are intended to  
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protect workers from aberrant managers. They have been effective in forcing AFPs to 
stay close to the average of the industry. The guarantee has never been called.
17  
 
AFPs do not suffer from any mismatching between their assets and liabilities because the 
value of liabilities is by definition equal to the value of assets. The only other capital 
regulation concerns the valuation of assets which is required to be marked-to-market. As 
most assets have to be invested in instruments that are traded on public markets, asset 
valuation is straightforward. The only major deviation from this practice concerns 
placements in bank deposits. However, these are usually of a short-term nature and thus 
the use of book rather than market values for them does not create any large 
discrepancies. 
 
The capital regulation of life insurance companies is far more complex. Since annuity 
business dominates the balance sheets of life insurers, the valuation of assets and 
liabilities and the regulation of any mismatches between them play a critical part in 
determining the capital adequacy of life insurers. Chile introduced the so-called CALCE 
reserve rule to regulate the asset/liability mismatches. This imposes higher technical 
reserves and capital requirements for companies that suffer from unmatched liabilities.
18  
 
The CALCE rule was adopted because insurance companies were not required to use 
mark-to-market asset valuation, partly because the companies followed a 'buy and hold' 
strategy and held debt instruments to maturity. The insurance regulators are now taking 
steps to introduce risk-based supervision that will focus on market valuation of assets and 
use of market rates of interest for valuing liabilities.  
 
In addition to the CALCE reserve, insurance companies were required to operate with a 
leverage of not higher than 15, which implied a required equity ratio of 6.7 percent. The 
leverage limit was raised to 20, lowering the required equity ratio to 5 percent. In 
addition, an asset sufficiency test was introduced. This requires a detailed calculation of 
future asset cash flows, allowing for credit and prepayment risks, and computation of the 
reinvestment rate that would be needed to equalize asset and liability flows. 
 
The last element in the annuity regulation of insurance companies concerns the offer of a 
government guarantee to annuitants in cases of insurer insolvency. The guarantee covers 
100 percent of payments up to the PBS level and 75 percent of any annuity payments 
above the PBS, up to UF 45 per month (approximately USD 1,800). The cost of the 
guarantee is not pre-funded but is covered from general tax revenues. However, the 
authorities have in place a speedy resolution mechanism that allows early interventions in 
companies that face financial difficulties. 
                                                 
17 The relative-rate-of-return guarantees were removed by the 2008 amendments. 
18 For a detailed exposition of this complicated rule, see Rocha and Thorburn (2007:118-130).   
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Table 13: Capital and Prudential Regulations 
  Main Regulations by Types of Institutions 
Australia  Superannuation Funds  
No capital buffer requirement. 
Actuarial funding and solvency certificate. 
Own life tables and discount rates subject to review. 
Licensing of trustees. 
 
Life Insurance Companies  
Solvency margins on wind-up basis. 
Capital adequacy margins on a going concern basis. 
Own life tables and discount rates subject to review. 
Close monitoring of free assets and target surplus.  
Chile  Pension Fund Administrators 
Capital adequacy requirement (encaje). 
Market valuation of assets. 
 
Life Insurance Companies 
Capital adequacy requirement. 
'Held to maturity' valuations. 
Prescribed life tables. 
CALCE rule discount rates and capital backing for 
mismatched asset/liability maturity bands. 
Denmark: ATP  Broadly similar to occupational funds.  
Denmark: Other  Life Insurance Companies and Pension Funds 
Solvency I capital requirement.  
'Fair value' accounting. 
Decomposition of technical provisions. 
Use of market maturity-dependent discount rates. 
Own life tables subject to review. 
Application of 'static' stress testing. 
Sweden: PPM  Broadly similar to occupational funds. 
Sweden: Other  Life Insurance Companies and Pension Funds 
Solvency I capital requirement.  
'Fair value' accounting. 
Own life tables subject to review. 
Own discount rates subject to ceiling. 
Application of 'static' stress testing. 
Switzerland  Pension Funds 
Combination of book and market valuations. 
Own life tables and discount rates subject to review. 
Temporary underfunding permitted. 
Expert certificate requirement. 
 
Life Insurance Companies 
Solvency I capital requirement. 
No underfunding allowed. 
Own life tables and discount rates subject to review. 
Combination of book and market valuations. 
Application of 'static' stress testing. 
Sources: Andersen and Skjodt (2007); Brunner and Thorburn (2008); Buetler and Ruesch (2007); Palmer 
(2008); Rocha and Rudolph (2010); Rocha and Thorburn (2007); and Vittas (2008).  
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Denmark completely revamped the solvency monitoring of life insurance companies and 
pension funds over the past decade or so. This has covered the use of "fair value" 
accounting for both assets and liabilities and the introduction of stress testing. The change 
has been gradual. Market values are used as fair values for assets that are traded on active 
and liquid markets but, for less liquid assets, fair valuation is obtained by applying 
sophisticated and acceptable valuation models.  
 
The valuation of liabilities faces more difficult conceptual issues since there is no active 
market for insurance and pension liabilities and therefore no readily observable market 
prices. By necessity, fair valuation is based on valuation models. A fair valuation model 
must overcome two major obstacles: the difficulty of determining the nominal value of 
insurance and pension liabilities in a market that is dominated by with-profits policies 
that are subject to minimum guaranteed benefits; and the perennial question of the 
appropriate rate of discount for calculating the present value of these liabilities. 
 
The valuation model that has been adopted involves the decomposition of technical 
provisions by level of guaranteed benefits and the use of a market-determined zero-
coupon yield curve. Pension institutions are free to set their own life tables but may be 
asked to provide justification for the tables used. However, all pension institutions are 
required to use the same maturity-dependent discount rates, which are given by the 




Investment rules were relaxed in 2001 with a significant increase in the limit for 
investments in risky assets. However, this relaxation was accompanied by the 
introduction of the so-called traffic light system. This covers stress testing that is divided 
into two scenarios, yellow and red, and measures the ability of individual pension 
institutions to cope with adverse changes in market conditions, such as changes in interest 
rates and substantial declines in equity prices. However, the stress tests are still at an 
early stage of development. They are specified in static terms, do not reflect past 
experience, and are the same irrespective of the state of financial markets.  
 
At present, the required capital of pension institutions follows the EU Solvency I 
approach, which does not take into account the riskiness of assets. When the institution 
bears the investment risk, capital must be no less than 4 percent of technical provisions 
plus 0.3 percent of the risk sum for life assurance and pension business. The capital 
requirement is reduced to 1 percent when the institution does not bear the investment 
risk, as for example in unit-linked products that are offered without any guarantees. 
                                                 
19 During the 2008 global financial crisis, the regulators allowed pension institutions to use the mortgage 
bond interest rates for valuing liabilities. The dispensation was granted for one year that was later extended 
and was prompted by the large impact of the crisis on the mortgage bond market. The intention was to 
prevent an even bigger collapse of the market and to allow pension institutions to remain technically 
solvent. It was a form of regulatory forbearance but was seen as a pragmatic response to the exceptional 
impact of the global crisis. The dispensation will be removed when normal market conditions are restored. 
The market capitalization of the Danish mortgage bond market is higher than the government bond market.  
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Denmark (in line with other EU countries) will introduce risk-based capital requirements 
when the Solvency II approach is finalized. 
 
In Sweden, insurance companies and pension funds are subject to prescribed rules on the 
investment of assets backing their technical reserves for guaranteed benefits but are free 
from quantitative restrictions for all other assets.
20 Risk-based supervision has followed a 
broadly similar approach to that used in Denmark but with a time lag. The traffic light 
system was introduced in 2006 while the use of a market-determined discount rate based 
on government bond and swap rates was mandated in 2007. However, the stress tests 
follow different specifications from those used in Denmark and insurance companies and 
pension funds are not yet required to use a marked-based yield curve published by the 
central bank. Insurance companies and pension funds use the same cohort life tables that 
are prepared by the insurance federation. Although the specifications of the stress tests 
differ from those used in Denmark, they share the same shortcomings: they are specified 
in static terms, do not reflect past experience, and are the same irrespective of the state of 
financial markets. 
 
In Switzerland, life insurance companies are subject to strict prudential rules and are not 
allowed to have any underfunding in their pension operations. Following the imposition 
of new standards of transparency in 2004, life insurance companies are now required to 
create a separate Security Fund for their liabilities related to the pension funds they 
manage, the assets of their pension business must be segregated from other assets, their 
pension business must be reported in a separate annual report, and strict rules apply to the 
distribution of investment profits. According to these rules, insurance companies must 
allocate at least 90 percent of the net investment income to the accounts of insured 
individuals. Insurance companies have been using cohort life tables elaborated by the 
insurance association since 2000.  
 
Insurance regulation is gradually moving in the direction of a Solvency II approach. In 
addition to imposing risk-based solvency requirements, this will also mandate the use of 
market-based maturity-dependent discount rates and will require a fair valuation of both 
assets and liabilities. Use of the traffic light system to assess the vulnerability of 
individual companies to specified financial shocks will also be included. 
 
In contrast, the solvency regulation of pension funds remains imprecise. Pension funds 
are required to employ certified pension experts to attest that they are able to meet their 
financial obligations. The prudential rules do not mandate the use of fair values for assets. 
In addition, pension funds are free to use their own mortality tables and discount rates for 
estimating the present value of liabilities. Autonomous pension funds are allowed to have 
a temporary underfunding, while public sector pension funds that benefit from a cantonal 
guarantee have been allowed to operate with significant actuarial shortfalls on the 
grounds that the cantonal authorities would stand behind the pension funds and guarantee 
their liabilities.  
 
                                                 
20 A 25 percent limit is placed on equity investments for the technical reserves of guaranteed benefits. The 
corresponding limit for the PPM is set at 30 percent.    
  39
The prudential supervision of autonomous pension funds is fragmented among several 
cantonal authorities and is characterized as passive and largely ineffective. Pension funds 
tend to understate their funding shortfalls and are usually required to correct their 
reported funding gaps but without any specified deadlines. As a result, funding gaps can 
persist for several years. The prudential regulation and supervision of pension funds is 
currently under intensive review. 
 
In Australia, there are significant differences between the capital regulation of pension 
funds and life insurance companies. Superannuation funds are not required to maintain 
capital buffers. Instead, a superannuation fund which offers a defined benefit is required 
to have an actuary sign a funding and solvency certificate, indicating that the fund is 
solvent and likely to remain so for a period of up to five years.  
 
On the other hand, the Life Insurance Act requires life companies to maintain both 
solvency and capital adequacy margins. Capital required to satisfy solvency requirements 
is determined on the basis that each Statutory Fund has sufficient assets to fund existing 
liabilities in the event of a wind-up of that fund. Capital adequacy rules require sufficient 
assets to fund existing liabilities on a going-concern basis. Capital adequacy requirements 
are generally higher than solvency requirements and act as an early warning trigger 
against the breach of solvency levels.  
 
Though not explicitly risk-based, the approach seeks to take into account risk factors and 
the likely volatility of assets and liabilities through the use of conservative prudential 
buffers. Most life insurers hold assets in excess of the capital adequacy requirements and 
many have a policy of monitoring these excess or “free assets” against what is known as 
a target surplus. There are no regulatory requirements in relation to the target surplus and 
the methodologies and rationale behind the development of target surplus by life insurers 
vary widely. However, APRA places increasing focus on the target surplus policies and 
practices of insurance companies, which it uses in its own risk rating of insurers and in 
determining the resources it devotes to their supervision.  
 
4.3 Risk  Management 
 
The risks faced by annuity providers can be classified into five major categories: 
underwriting risks, market risks, credit and other asset risks, operational risks, and 
liquidity risks (Rocha and Thorburn 2007:44-46, 60-70). The handling of these risks 
depends on the sophistication of internal management systems and the complexity of 
operations and instruments.  
 
In the five countries covered in this book, insurance companies and pension funds have 
over time improved considerably their risk management capabilities, although their 
success in dealing with these risks has been influenced by many factors that are not 
related to risk management per se. For instance, corporate sponsors of pension schemes 
in Australia, as in most Anglo-American countries, have converted their pension schemes 
to a defined-contribution basis, benefiting from the contribution holidays they were able 
to take as well as from releasing some of the funding surplus that had been built into the  
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schemes. The investment risk has been transferred to workers, although pension funds 
and insurance companies retain some investment risk in connection with their capital 
guaranteed products. As life annuities are little developed in Australia, retired workers 
bear the longevity risk.  
 
Life insurance companies and superannuation funds are required to have in place risk 
management strategies and to develop risk mitigation and control policies. Segregation of 
duties and avoidance of conflicts of interest in assigning responsibilities are underscored 
as important components of internal control systems. But the preponderance of 
investment-linked assets and the underdevelopment of life annuities have implied a 
limited exposure to investment and longevity risks. As a result, except for defined benefit 
and hybrid superannuation funds and investment products with guaranteed benefits, there 
has been little interest in promoting the use of hedging instruments, such as long-term 
interest rate swaps, longevity bonds or longevity derivatives. 
 
Switzerland is at the other extreme of the spectrum. The use of a uniform annuity 
conversion factor protects retiring workers from fluctuations in interest rates at the time 
of retirement and from the dispersion of annuity prices among competing providers. 
Investment and longevity risks are borne by providers, which are exposed to large risks 
when regulated prices deviate significantly from market levels and large shortfalls 
emerge.   
 
However, changes in the uniform annuity conversion factor in the face of changing 
demographics and investment returns cause long-term risks to be shared among 
successive generations of retirees, while investment risk is lowered by more frequent 
changes in the minimum interest rate in line with changes in market returns.  Inflation 
risk is borne by pensioners, although pension funds are expected to make adjustments to 
pensions in payment to cover inflation, provided this is permitted by their financial 
situation.  
 
Insurance companies and the large pension funds have adopted increasingly sophisticated 
asset/liability management strategies. In the 1990s, the larger institutions expanded 
considerably their investments in domestic and foreign equities. The high returns relative 
to the minimum guaranteed interest rate allowed greater leeway to pension funds to 
assume higher risks and also to take contribution holidays or increase benefits. Smaller 
funds applied more conservative investment policies.  
 
Asset/liability management policies became more conservative when financial returns 
declined in the new millennium. Greater emphasis is now placed on ensuring that the 
pension funds are able to meet their long-term obligations. The larger institutions 
undertake detailed measurement of risks and calculate the impact on their financial 
position of adverse changes in interest rates, foreign exchange, equity prices, private 
equity, and real estate values. There is also increasing use of hedging facilities, including 
interest rate derivatives and swap contracts.  
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Because pension funds have little scope in setting the terms of the annuity contracts in the 
mandatory part of the system, they have not adopted an active management of longevity 
risk. Almost all pension funds use the mortality tables provided by the Federal Insurance 
Fund (FIF), with possible adjustments based on past experience, especially for pension 
funds with a high degree of homogeneity among their annuitants (e.g., construction 
workers, teachers or bank employees). Insurance companies introduced in 2000 cohort 
life tables for pricing their annuities in the open market, but in the mandatory pillar most 
institutions augment their actuarial liabilities by 0.4 to 0.5 percent every year, until the 
new FIF mortality rates become available, i.e., every 10 years. No attempt has been made 
so far to use longevity bonds or derivatives to hedge longevity risk.  
 
In Sweden, life insurance companies and pension funds engage in asset/liability matching 
that is dictated by the prevalence of 5 to 10 year term annuities. Since retired workers 
assume both the investment and longevity risks, providers are essentially concerned with 
managing the risks arising from the offer of minimum guaranteed benefits. Providers 
invest in domestic and international equities and real estate with a view to enhancing 
returns and bonuses but maintain an adequate cushion of bond holdings to avoid the need 
to declare negative bonuses and to cover their guaranteed benefits. 
 
The PPM where use of life annuities is compulsory has a longer horizon. It adopts a 
highly conservative estimation of future trends in longevity, while the recent lowering of 
the guaranteed benefits from an interest rate of 2.75 to 0 percent has simplified its risk 
management task.   
 
In Denmark, pension institutions had expanded their equity investments in the 1990s but 
were hit by the dramatic fall in interest rates and large declines in equity prices between 
2001 and 2003. They reacted by reducing their equity portfolios (in large part caused by 
the very fall of equity prices), selling short-duration bonds and buying long-duration 
ones, especially foreign bonds, and engaging in extensive hedging operations, mostly 
through the use of long-term interest rate swaps in the more liquid euro market. 
 
Investment and risk management policies reflect the terms and conditions of collective 
labor agreements. Some of them provide for risk-sharing among both active and retired 
workers. The statutory ATP fund operates a scheme with deferred group annuities where 
guaranteed benefits are specified for each year's contributions and periodic bonus 
payments aim to maintain the real value of benefits and reflect longevity experience and 
investment performance. The ATP fund is hedging all its pension liabilities in the euro 
swap market and is using excess investment returns from its active investment 
management to finance longevity reserves and periodic bonuses. It has also expanded its 
investments in foreign bonds.  Some multi-employer pension funds and life insurance 
companies follow similar policies, but others make less extensive use of long-term swap 
contracts. However, all pension institutions have adapted their guaranteed benefits to the 
new reality of lower nominal interest rates and have adjusted their investment portfolios 
to the demands of the traffic light system and regular stress testing.   
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Finally, in Chile life insurance companies are required to offer indexed annuities and 
cover the inflation risk by investing predominantly in inflation-indexed securities. Life 
insurance companies have expanded their investments in higher-yielding corporate and 
mortgage bonds, which are also indexed to inflation. This has allowed them to offer 
better terms on their annuity products and thus raise the MWRs. However, insurance 
companies assume the longevity risk as well as extensive reinvestment risk in view of the 
significant mismatching in the duration of assets and liabilities. Very little use is made of 
reinsurance arrangements and risk hedging instruments. Despite several attempts, the 
market has not succeeded in issuing a longevity bond in Chile. A government guarantee 
protects pensioners from the risk of insolvency of individual insurance companies.  
 
4.4  Risk Sharing Arrangements 
 
Risk-based capital requirements force annuity providers to apply conservative 
assumptions on their investment and longevity risks. However, this approach is not 
immune from problems. Excessive conservatism may lead to overly expensive products 
and higher than anticipated profits, creating pressures for the sharing of excess profits 
with annuitants and for price regulation. To avoid these problems annuity providers use 
risk-sharing arrangements, whereby annuitants share in the investment and longevity 
risks.  
 
Risk-sharing arrangements are not formally used in the mandatory pillar of Switzerland. 
However, as already noted, the recent change in the uniform annuity conversion factor 
has effectively introduced an inter-generational risk-sharing arrangement.  
 
In Australia their use is limited to allocated annuities with capital guarantees.  Risk-
sharing arrangements were authorized in Chile in 2004 with the introduction of variable 
annuities in conjunction with the purchase of PBS fixed real annuities.
21 During the 
accumulation phase, the investment risk will continue to be borne by workers, within the 
limits set by the relative rate of return guarantees that are applied to the different types of 
permitted funds, but in the payout phase the risks will be shared among annuitants using 
these products. However, despite its authorization since 2004, the variable annuity market 
has yet to be developed in Chile.  
 
Risk-sharing arrangements are widely used in Sweden and Denmark. Pension institutions 
assume the investment and longevity risks up to the level of guaranteed benefits, while 
pensioners share these risks for bonus payments. Inflation risk is covered by the payment 
of bonuses, which aim in the first place to maintain the real value of benefits. In Sweden, 
a basic objective of public policy is to prevent intergenerational transfers and thus active 
workers bear the investment risk during the accumulation phase but do not share in the 
investment and longevity risks of pensioners. 
 
However, in Denmark the ATP and some occupational pension schemes offer deferred 
group annuities where the investment and longevity risks of profit participating policies 
are shared among both active and retired workers. In contrast, in unit-linked annuities, the 
                                                 
21 In the case of early retirement pension, it has to account at least for 150 percent of the PBS   
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use of which has been growing in both Denmark and Sweden, the investment risk is 
borne by individual pensioners and only the longevity risk is shared by annuitants. 
 
5.  Lessons for Other Countries 
 
Policymakers in countries that have reformed or are planning to reform their pension 
systems face several questions regarding the organization of the payout phase of the new 
systems. The first question concerns the feasibility of creating a sound market for lifetime 
retirement products. The second concerns the role that restrictions on payout options can 
play in promoting an adequate level of annuitization. Other questions address the 
regulation of pricing and marketing policies, the institutional structure of markets, the 
creation of a robust regulatory framework and the development of appropriate hedging 
instruments for managing the main risks of retirement products. The experience of 
markets for retirement products in the five countries reviewed in this paper suggests 
several lessons for other countries.
22  
 
5.1  The Feasibility of Sound Market Development 
 
The experience of Chile confirms the feasibility of developing a sound market for 
retirement products from a very low initial base. When Chile implemented its 1981 
pension reform the market for retirement products did not exist. Twenty nine years later 
Chile has a well developed and rapidly growing market for phased withdrawals and life 
annuities. 
 
The Chilean approach entailed restrictions on lump-sum distributions. These were 
justified by the absence of an adequate public pension for middle and high income 
workers.  It also mandated the use of fixed inflation-indexed annuities or lifetime phased 
withdrawals to protect pensioners from inflation risk. Requiring the use of joint life 
annuities initially for married males, and more recently for married couples, provided 
protection to surviving spouses, while allowing use of guaranteed life annuities for 10 or 
15 years addressed the bequest motive. As the market matured, the rules were adapted 
and allowed the use of combinations of minimum fixed real annuities with either phased 
withdrawals or variable annuities.  
 
Chile created a rigorous regulatory regime for providers of retirement products to 
minimize the bankruptcy risk faced by pensioners. It also promoted the offer of inflation-
indexed products and financial instruments to support the efficient operation of providers 
of retirement products and introduced state guarantees to protect pensioners against 
provider insolvency as well as aberrant behavior. 
 
The market for lifetime retirement products is not well developed in Australia. This is not 
attributed to any major supply constraints but largely reflects the presence of a modest 
means-tested universal age pension, the strong preference of Australians for lump sum 
                                                 
22 These questions as they affect the design of the payout phase in Central and Eastern European countries 
have been addressed in Vittas et al (2010).  
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withdrawals and term annuities, and their effective reliance on self-annuitization. The 
absence of any restrictions on lump sums and term annuities has been a contributing 
factor. 
 
Denmark and Switzerland provide large annuitized benefits to most retiring workers from 
their public and occupational pillars, while in Sweden the two components of the public 
pillar offer large benefits, also in the form of life annuities. All three countries have 
adopted policies that promote the offer of lifetime retirement products on a sound 
financial basis. Sweden, in particular, has adopted many changes in the structure of its 
public pension system and the regulation of insurance business that have transformed the 
landscape for the market of retirement products. However, as in Denmark and 
Switzerland, the market continues to be dominated by lifetime products from the public 
and occupational pillars. The demand for life annuities in the open market continues to be 
limited in all three countries. 
 
5.2  The Regulation of Payout Options 
 
The degree of annuitization observed in different countries is largely explained by 
regulatory or plan restrictions on payout options. If a high degree of annuitization is a 
policy objective, the menu of retirement products and payout options must be regulated 
accordingly. However, it is important to avoid over-annuitization. This implies taking 
into account other conditions prevailing in different countries, in particular the presence 
and relative importance of public pensions from pillars zero and one. The optimal policy 
on payout options is bound to be country specific. 
 
The Chilean approach to product regulation is appropriate for countries that expect the 
new second pillar to play a major role in retirement provision and social protection. The 
restrictions on lump-sums increase the potential demand for all retirement products, 
including life annuities. A PW formula that is based on life expectancy prevents a very 
premature exhaustion of funds.
23 The imposition of fixed annuities indexed to inflation, 
and joint annuities for married couples, contributes to prevent an early exhaustion of 
funds and poverty in old age. The introduction of new products, such as variable and 
adjustable annuities, should require a minimum fixed annuity component providing a 
minimum level of investment and longevity insurance. This is very important in countries 
where the public social security system is either closed down or reduced to a subsistence 
level. 
 
Countries with larger zero and/or first public pillars could adopt a more liberal approach 
to the regulation of payout options since in these cases the exposure of retiring workers to 
investment and longevity risk is more limited. Fewer restrictions could be imposed on 
lump-sum withdrawals, although very liberal rules for lump-sums can hinder 
significantly the development of the market for retirement products, especially the market 
for life annuities. 
 
                                                 
23 This requirement was recently extended to a well-above-average life expectancy, limiting the exposure of 
government funds to this risk.    
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The appropriate policies in this area will vary significantly from country to country. In 
some cases it may be appropriate to continue restricting lump-sums, but adopt a more 
liberal approach to the design of retirement products. For example, the regulation of 
phased withdrawals and term annuities may be more liberal, allowing designs that enable 
a faster withdrawal of funds. Term annuities play an important part in Denmark and 
Sweden and have a rapidly growing presence in Australia. Likewise, variable and 
adjustable annuities may be introduced without the obligation of a minimum fixed 
annuity component. 
 
5.3  The Regulation of Pricing and Marketing Policies 
 
The experience of Switzerland indicates that pervasive regulation of products and prices 
entails both benefits and costs. The use of a minimum annuity conversion factor for joint 
life annuities avoids an excessive dispersion of annuity prices across annuitants with 
similar characteristics and also protects retiring workers of different cohorts from large 
fluctuations in market prices of both assets and annuities. A high level of price dispersion 
and exposure to annuitization risk are present in countries that do not regulate prices.  
 
However, rigid price regulation may generate large income transfers across annuitants of 
different gender and marital status and may even jeopardize the solvency of annuity 
providers if it is not subject to flexible adjustment to market prices. The Swiss authorities 
are still grappling with the problem of defining a pricing formula that will protect 
annuitants from price dispersion and annuitization risk while being flexible enough to 
avoid unintended intra and inter-generational transfers and cope well with changing 
financial market conditions.    
 
The regulation of pricing policies for variable annuities is confronted with some difficult 
challenges. In Denmark and Sweden, where these products are widespread, pricing 
issues, such as the calculation of initial payments and profit-sharing rules, are governed 
by collective labor agreements. As a result, they require less government regulation. But 
in systems that are based on non-employer-based individual accounts, pricing policies 
need to be subject to government regulation and oversight. The calculation of initial 
payments may need to be regulated to prevent deceptive offers. And a central register of 
performance data of different providers, emphasizing operating fees, profit-sharing rules 
and consistency of investment policies rather than just past investment returns, should be 
created to enhance the transparency of the system.
24        
 
The regulation of the marketing of retirement products, especially life annuities, is 
another area of major policy interest in countries with open annuity markets. Adopting an 
electronic quotation system, such as the one introduced in Chile in 2004, should receive 
ample consideration. This would be a centralized service that would compile and validate 
                                                 
24 If the authorities choose to specify a low technical interest rate, say 0 or1 percent, for the calculation of 
initial payments in order to provide greater scope for future bonuses, they should avoid the trap of applying 
the same technical rate for the calculation of technical reserves. The latter should require the use of market-
based maturity-dependent discount rates to ensure a proper valuation of reserves and allow room for 
investments in equities and other real assets.    
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individual data on retiring workers and would solicit quotes from participating 
institutions. Such a system would reduce the influence of brokers, lower the search costs 
of retiring workers, enhance the quality of information available to them, and ensure 
broad access to competitively prices annuities. 
 
A necessary requirement of an effective regulation of marketing would be compliance 
with basic conduct rules, such as the "know-your-customer" rule and an adequate 
disclosure of the terms and conditions of different products. Because annuity products are 
highly complex as well as irreversible and nontransferable, there would also be a need for 
extensive training of agents and brokers. Licensing and training of brokers and financial 
advisers involved in the marketing of annuities would be essential for promoting good 
business conduct and preventing potential abuse of less informed consumers. 
 
In addition to adequate training, brokers would need to pass a certification test as well as 
the standard "fit and proper" test. Licensed brokers must be legally obligated to represent 
their clients, must generate their income from commissions on the sale of annuities, and 
must not be permitted to accept volume-related remuneration from insurers. Since 
supervision of brokers and pension advisors can be costly and time consuming, support in 
enforcing codes of good practices from SROs are welcome. Some countries have felt the 
need to introduce harsher regulations, such as the imposition of regulated caps on broker 
commissions in Chile or the complete prohibition of the involvement of brokers in 
Colombia. 
 
5.4  The Institutional Structure of Markets 
 
Another policy issue concerns the institutional structure of the market for retirement 
products. The main choice is between centralized provision through a single provider and 
provision through a decentralized competitive market. Centralized provision is usually 
channeled through a public entity although it could also in principle be based on a highly 
regulated private entity. The zero and first public pillars, where they exist, rely on 
centralized provision through a public agency. As they almost always involve the offer of 
inflation-indexed compulsory lifetime annuities, their products play a central part in the 
annuity markets of most countries. Denmark and Sweden among the countries covered in 
this book also use public agencies for the centralized offer of supplementary lifetime 
annuities. 
 
Centralized provision has several potential advantages. It allows for a larger base of risk 
pooling, especially if annuitization is compulsory. It also benefits from scale economies 
and avoids the heavy marketing costs that are incurred by decentralized providers. The 
main disadvantages are the potentially weaker incentives for product innovation and 
operational efficiency that may result from compulsory participation and monopoly 
market positions.
25 With public ownership and/or extensive public regulation, there is 
also a high risk of extraneous interference in annuity pricing and asset management. Such 
                                                 
25 It should, however, be noted that, despite their weaker incentives, public entities have often taken the 
lead in product innovations. A good example is offered by the Danish ATP, which has been a leader in both 
product innovation and sophisticated asset management.  
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interference may well result in transferring the investment and longevity risks back to the 
state. 
 
However, because of scale economies, decentralized markets veer over time toward 
oligopolistic structures that negate their innovation and efficiency advantages. Recent 
progress in several countries in adopting robust governance safeguards and high levels of 
transparency for their public pension funds strengthens the case for the centralized 
provision of lifetime annuities, meeting at least some of the retirement needs of 
pensioners.
26       
 
5.5  The Creation of Robust and Effective Prudential Regulation and Supervision 
 
Another major challenge concerns the creation of a robust and effective prudential 
regulatory and supervisory framework for the providers of retirement products. The 
framework should involve risk-based supervision rather than a checklist of rule 
compliance. It should also rely on risk-based solvency rules that specify solvency capital 
requirements on the basis of the asset and liability risks borne by providers.  
 
Providers of retirement products should be able to price their products freely and use 
mortality tables that are most appropriate for their own clienteles. Any regulated 
parameters should be kept up-to-date by frequent validation and revision and should be 
based on market-based criteria in order to minimize persistent biases in pricing and 
selection. Providers of retirement products should be allowed to offer all types of 
retirement products, avoiding the market segmentation that has been prevalent in Chile. 
However, the institutions involved should be required to maintain separate accounting 
data for different products, distinguishing clearly between products with and without 
guaranteed benefits, and avoiding cross-subsidization across different products.  
 
Strict regulation of risk management should also be introduced, requiring providers of 
retirement products to maintain adequate levels of technical reserves and risk capital and 
to apply regularly rigorous stress tests to their various products, depending on the 
allocation of investment and longevity risks. Clear rules should be applied to the 
valuation of assets and liabilities and to the capital buffers that would be needed to cover 
the financial impact of asset and liability mismatches. These are challenging issues even 
in the countries with the most developed markets. Regulatory practices would need to 
evolve and adapt to the emerging lessons from the growing global experience in the 
management of the many and varied risks facing the markets for retirement products. 
 
Finally, intervention and bankruptcy rules should be modernized to prevent an early 
depletion of provider assets in a bankruptcy scenario. An effective resolution mechanism 
will avoid a significant reduction in the residual value of assets left to honor annuity and 
phased withdrawal payments and an increase in the cost of any government guarantees. 
In a system of mandatory savings, pensioners may deserve a preferential treatment over 
other claimants on the assets of providers of retirement products. 
 
                                                 
26 Vittas et al (2008) reviews the recent experience of four public pension funds in some OECD countries.    
  48
The introduction of government guarantees for holders of retirement products, life 
annuities or phased withdrawals, may well be necessary in a system of mandatory saving 
for retirement purposes. These should cover both the accumulation and payout phases. 
The government guarantees should emulate evolving practice in deposit insurance 
schemes, including a reasonable amount of coinsurance by pensioners in order to 
minimize the possible loss of market discipline at the point of purchase and funding by ex 
ante or ex post risk-based assessments as well as some reliance on budgetary resources. 
 
5.6  The Promotion of Efficient Risk Management  
 
The regulation of payout options and retirement products needs to consider the supply of 
financial instruments and hedging tools that would enable the providers of retirement 
products to adopt efficient risk management techniques. The imposition of inflation 
indexation in the absence of inflation-indexed instruments may lead to the offer of poorly 
priced products with hefty risk premiums. Countries that consider mandating the use of 
inflation-linked annuities should make a serious effort to expand the supply of inflation-
indexed financial instruments from both the public and private sectors or consider the use 
of alternative types of annuities, such as escalating annuities. Escalating nominal 
annuities, where regular monthly payments are adjusted once a year at a predetermined 
rate of between 2 and 5 percent would be a more suitable product for countries with 
underdeveloped financial and insurance markets.   
 
The development of sound annuity and phased withdrawal markets necessitates the 
adoption of a clear and ambitious capital market agenda for the payout phase. For the 
government, the development of long-duration inflation-indexed instruments implies a 
significant modernization of public debt management, focusing on the promotion of 
liquid benchmark issues and the adoption of reliable issuance programs. For the private 
sector, it implies adoption of rules that eliminate any obstacles to the issuance of long-
dated inflation-linked instruments. 
 
In addition, governments need to promote the development of derivative markets, such as 
long-term interest rate swap and swaption contracts to allow hedging the investment risk 
of long-term liabilities as well as the use of longevity bonds and reinsurance markets to 
support the hedging of longevity risk. Developing longevity bonds and derivatives is 
likely to be a tall order for most countries around the world since such products have yet 
to emerge even in the most advanced financial markets.  
 
An alternative approach would be to rely on extensive risk-sharing arrangements, similar 
to those widely practiced in Denmark and Sweden. These offer an attractive option in 
addressing the highly complex longevity and investment risks in markets with an 
inadequate supply of long-term instruments.  
 
However, risk-sharing arrangements introduce their own challenges. They presuppose a 
high level of transparency and integrity of annuity providers, adoption of effective 
pricing rules, involving the use of cohort mortality tables to minimize subsequent  
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adjustments in annual bonuses, and rules that avoid transfers of income across different 
cohorts.  
 
There is also a need for transparent and robust rules to ensure consistent long-term 
fairness in the distribution of profits between shareholders and policyholders. This is 
clearly a more important issue in the case of oligopolistic decentralized markets, where 
market discipline may be less powerful than is often assumed, but it is also relevant in the 
case of public monopolies, especially in ensuring a fair treatment of all cohorts and 
avoiding the use of surpluses for extraneous purposes.     
 
5.7 In  Conclusion 
 
Clearly, the lessons learned from the experience of the five countries reviewed in this 
paper are manifold and challenging. The development of retirement products is a new 
challenge that emerges from the changing landscape in most countries, the result of 
increasing longevity, globalized competition, and market fluidity. Complete reliance on 
traditional social security systems and defined-benefit company pensions is no longer 
feasible anywhere in the world. As the development of robust systems of retirement 
savings both during the accumulation and payout phases attracts increasing attention in 
most countries, it is hoped that the review of lessons contained in this paper will help 
policymakers in many developing countries in better formulating their policy options and 
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